Schilde in BU Law Review on War’s Hidden Actors
Kaija Schilde, Assistant Professor of International Relations at the Frederick S. Pardee School of Global Studies, published an article in the BU Law Review on the impact of private actors on national security.
“I wrote about the role of private actors in war as the “fourth branch” of government and their role in national security,” Schilde said. “I assessed the role of private contractors as one that increased the war powers authority of the presidential branch of government, but at the same time limited the capacity of the government in crafting national security goals and strategies.”
Schilde’s article, “War Powers, Private Actors, and National Security State Capacity,” was published in Volume 95, Number 4 of the issue.
From the text of the article:
What is the impact—if any—of private actors on war powers in the United States? Influence may be twofold, affecting each of the legislative and executive branches of government. First, the increasing outsourcing of national security policymaking and expertise (and delegation to private military companies) enhances presidential autonomy over war, but simultaneously creates constraints on the executive branch through the hollowing out of the bureaucratic capacity of executive agencies and institutions.
Second, the diffusion of defense industry manufacturing within the United States has also changed the priorities and preferences of the legislative branch after WWII, leading to a contemporary situation where Congress is the protector of military spending and the longevity of weapons systems. This has led to an ample supply of the standing resources needed to wage war—therefore also increasing the war powers of the executive branch—but it has also constrained both the legislative and executive branches in their ability to craft strategic policy responsive to changing structures and threats in the international system.
When you include private as well as public actors in an analysis of U.S. war powers, the conclusion that there is an increasingly imperial presidency is less conclusive; it may be more autonomous and possess impressive standing war resources, but it is also more constrained than ever before due to a diminished capacity to set strategic national security policy.
You can read the entire article here.
Schilde’s teaching and research interests include the politics of the European Union, particularly the emerging foreign and security policies of the EU, the political economy of defense and security industries, the linkages between public and private actors in Brussels, the historical and comparative dynamics of federalism, and European public opinion on EU politics. Learn more about her here.