BEYOND NEOLIBERALISM

Social Analysis after 1989

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CHAPTER 13

The Uneasy Relationship between "China" and "Globalization" in Post-Cold War Scholarship

Julie Michelle Klinger

INTRODUCTION

The 1989 fall of the former Soviet Union stimulated new forms of social scientific inquiry in China and the West, notably with the addition of "Global Studies" or "Globalization" departments to the Cold War-era Area Studies specialties. Meanwhile, the field of "China studies" reemerged after several decades of marginalization in the West, and took on new domestic significance in the context of post-Reform China. The new prominence of these fields is generally understood as accompanying broader changes in post-1989 international politics and culture, notably: the expansion of tenets of Western economic liberalism; the internationalization of China's scholars, political vision, and economic strategy; and the concurrent (but incomplete) relaxation of controls against foreign researchers in China. As significant as these changes are, there remain some important continuities: the former distinctions between "East/West" and "Occident/Orient," rather than being overcome by the totalizing forces of globalization, per-

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sist in the conceptual gaps between "Global" and "China" scholarship insofar as "globalization" is often taken to mean "westernization," which is counterposed to an essentialist view of "China." This tendency is equally conspicuous among contemporary Chinese and Western scholarship.

Although China's transformation into a twenty-first-century power has been facilitated by what are generally understood as the tenets of global neoliberal modernity, namely capital deregulation and the emergence of the new international division of labor, there remains an uneasy epistemological relationship between scholarship on post-Reform China and "globalization." This tension emerges from the tendency to view globalization as driven by Euro-American power on one hand, while considering China as somehow exceptional to—rather than thoroughly embedded within—globalizing phenomena on the other. While place-based specifications provide a crucial check against the homogenizing tendencies of certain global models and discourses, this chapter contends that the troubled relationship between "China" and "globalization" paradigms is due more to enduring Cold War-era geographical imaginaries in both China and the West, which insist on placing *either* China *or* "the West" as the driver of contemporary history.

This chapter emphatically does not argue for collapsing "China" into "globalization" or vice versa: globalization alone cannot explain China's transformation any more than China's transformation is sufficient to explain globalization. What has not yet gained sufficient traction in post-Cold War scholarship on these subjects is a cogent, grounded sense of how these processes are mutually informed through material and discursive practice. This has important implications for how we differentiate between "global" capitalism and "state" capitalism as well as theories of the state under neoliberal modernity. Examining these implications in depth is beyond the scope of this chapter and is taken up elsewhere (Klinger 2015). In service to the more modest project of exploring the roots of these epistemological tensions, the chapter proceeds as follows. The first section provides some historically informed definitions to orient the discussion. This is important because identical theoretical terms carry very different meanings between Chinese and Western scholarship (Liu 2009). Section two discusses the problem, or the source of the tension between post-1989 epistemologies on "China" and "globalization." Sections three and four delve a bit deeper to look at the disciplinary situations of "globalization" and "China" studies inside and outside of China. The concluding section briefly evaluates how the disciplines and research practices have contended with the post-1989 world order.

Although this collection is concerned with the changes in social scientific inquiry following the Cold War, it bears mentioning that the paradigm shifts of the post-Cold War world emphasized certain longer-term historical currents that are emblematic of the contradictions within contemporary globalization *writ large*, namely an ongoing struggle between integration and nationalism, as well as the tension between identity politics and class politics on national and global scales. This chapter argues that the epistemic rupture between "China" and "Globalization" is something that owes its particular form to Cold War-era continuities, while its intensity is attributable to the post-1989 processes generally understood as "Globalization" and "China's Rise." The political roots for both can be traced to the decade before the end of the Cold War: to Reagan and Thatcher's determination to deregulate capital across international space in the late 1970s and early 1980s, following closely on Deng Xiaoping's 1978 "Open Door Policy," which selectively allowed international capital into China.

DEFINITIONS: GLOBALIZATION(S), CHINA STUDIES, AREA STUDIES

The *Dictionary of Human Geography* has this to say about globalization:

> A big buzzword in political speech and a ubiquitous analytical category in academic debate, *globalization* operates today like *modernization* did in the mid-twentieth century as the key term of a master discourse about the general state of the world. (Sparke 2009)

In the post-1989 world, globalization has been used to describe supposedly inevitable global integration driven by free-market capitalism which also (paradoxically) required sweeping neoliberal reforms in order to be realized.[1] Arguably, the most famous Anglophone champion of this sort of globalization is Thomas Freidman, who wrote in 1999 that it is characterized and driven by "free-market capitalism...enabling individuals, corporations, and nation-states reach around the world farther, faster, deeper and cheaper than ever before" (Friedman 1999: 7–8 quoted in Sparke 2009: 308–309). In this view, the protagonists were "First World" actors "reaching" into the underdeveloped "Third World," to create a liberal capitalist totality. The idea of global integration is hardly new, however much it might have been understood as the highest point of

civilizational development following the end of the Cold War. Over a century before, Marx and Engels' *Communist Manifesto* advanced a very similar interpretation of global integration but as part of an inevitable *anti*-capitalist process. The idea was that the internationalization of the bourgeoisie would likewise create a globally united working class that would eventually revolt (Sparke 2009).

Mao Zedong, founder of the People's Republic of China in 1949 and its leader until his death in 1976, read the *Communist Manifesto* in 1919 while employed as a library assistant at Peking University (Brook 2005). His stance on globalization is generally interpreted through his rejection of Japanese regional hegemony and American global militarism as "semi-feudal" and "semi-colonial." In the West, this refusal of imperialist subjugation has been understood as isolationism amidst the inevitable march of globalization, evinced by Mao's elevation of self-sufficiency above all other values as well as his eventual conflation of communism with nationalism. The latter move was a political expedient to banish counterrevolutionaries from a very specific ethnonational imaginary of the Chinese nation.

What is often missing from the conventional wisdom on the matter is that Mao's rejections of Amero-Japanese hegemony, and later of what he called Soviet revisionism, was a rejection of globalization on American, Japanese, or, later, Soviet terms. Amidst the various splits and rejections, Communist China pursued globalization on its own terms, with countries participating in the 1955 Bandung conference and Non-Aligned Movement. Driving Mao's international engagement was his own formulation of the Three Worlds theory, which held that the superpowers, both the United States and the USSR, belonged to the first world; the second world consisted of their allies, and the third world of the Non-Aligned Movement. Mao held that the first and second worlds exploited the third. He envisioned as a solution global agrarian revolution driven by peasants in nonaligned countries overthrowing their oppressors. This, in turn, would inspire the peasants and proletariat in the first and second worlds to revolt. In keeping with his philosophy that "political power comes from the barrel of a gun," China provided military aid to Maoist and insurgent groups in Africa and Central and South Asia. Anticipating the worldwide revolution, Mao extended economic aid and comprehensive scholarships in science, engineering, and political training to scholars from nonaligned countries, a practice that still continues today.

Since the end of the Cold War, this story of Maoist internationalism is generally sanitized out of most accounts of contemporary globalization,

both in Anglophone and Sinophone literature. In China, Mao's thought has been revised to be pro-business and staunchly ethno-nationalist in contradiction to his hybrid philosophy of "patriotism as internationalism" that drove his third world anti-imperialist projects.[2] A recent, two-volume compendium of significant events of Mao's life contains sections on the revolutionary role of business in enriching the country, citing events in which Mao reportedly praised merchants as contributing to a strong China (Li and Zheng 2011). Slowly, over the two decades between Deng Xiaoping's 1978 reforms and China's 2001 accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), globalization came to mean westernization and consumerism "with special Chinese characteristics" (Zemin 2002).

These shifting definitions of globalization emphasized an essentialist notion of ethno-nationalism, which in translation lent itself to hegemonic Anglophone discourses about a once-closed and mysterious China "coming out" into the world. This essentialism serves the ends of the one-party state, which deploys slogans of ethno-national unity in opposition to the outside world as a core part of its domestic propaganda work (Bulag 2012; Enlai 1984). Although contemporary economic activity in China is decidedly capitalist in character, it is not called as such: terms such as "finance," "economic growth," "development," and "Socialism with special Chinese characteristics" help maintain cognitive separation between the capitalism in the rest of the world, and the exceptionalism of the "China model." This is consistent with the theories of resurgent nationalisms in the contemporary era of globalization insofar as post-1989 scholars noted the apparently paradoxical trend of "unexpected" or "unprecedented" militant identity politics during what was supposed to be a time of growing openness and integration (Sabanadze 2010).

China Studies

The field of China studies differs inside and outside of China. Although in both contexts the field takes an interdisciplinary approach to acquainting students with the history, culture, politics, economy, and languages of China, there are three major differences. The first two are to be expected: China studies outside of China are generally taught in translation, and begin at the introductory level with postsecondary students. The third difference is more significant for the epistemological rupture with which this chapter is concerned. Namely, China Studies within China has its roots in the Imperial Examination system, in what could perhaps be understood

as the Chinese humanities canon, whereas China studies outside of China has its roots in Cold War-era Area Studies specializations, which grew out of the post–World War II geopolitical priorities of the United States (Wallerstein 1997). The significance of this lies in the difference between a civilizational and a geopolitical approach to "China." The former is humanistic and the latter is adversarial; likewise, the former is primarily motivated by an imperative to enrich and appreciate the historical-cultural canon, while the latter is driven by the imperative to understand a significant (and potentially rival) "other" to the Euro-American "self." Both approaches can share similar pitfalls, namely state-centrism and ethno-national essentialism.

Area Studies

What it takes to be considered an Area specialist is not complicated: someone with sufficient language proficiency to focus their research in a given place (usually defined by country or region), using primary resources. This need not be a foreign country, though the implicit assumption is that this is often the case. China studies, therefore, is a subfield of East Asian studies populated by specialists across social scientific disciplines: political science, history, anthropology, sociology, economics, geography, and so on. Although the geopolitical assumptions of Area studies have been critiqued in several disciplines (Walder 2004), the geographical commitments necessary to conduct research in anthropology, geography, and history have kept runaway universalisms in check with the steady onslaught of evidence that place matters, places are different, and difference is fundamental to the functioning of globalization as we know it. Yet, this has not addressed the epistemic rupture between China studies and globalization studies.

THE PROBLEM

The crux of the problem lies in the role of the state in relation to globalization as imagined after the end of the Cold War. Not just any state, but the difference between immediate Cold War victors on the one hand and China on the other. The hegemonic narrative of globalization—that of universalizing economic liberalism along with ever-deepening global integration—has assigned an exceptional position to the United States and Western Europe as primary drivers of a process in which "inexorable market and technological forces…take shape in the core of the global economy

and radiate out from there," to "impact" the rest of the globe (Hart 2002: 13). Social scientific literature is rife with such framings (Zheng 2002; Nissanke and Thorbecke 2006; Black and Brainerd 2002), which deny agency to "the local" and conceive of globalization as a teleological rather than dialectical process. On the other hand, China had been assigned a passive role insofar as China's post-1989 transformations were generally understood as resulting from "the impact of globalization," on domestic politics, culture, and economics (Zheng 2004). This is a problem because globalization has been framed as a unidirectional process; something to which China "responds" or "adapts" as part of its linear trajectory toward liberalization.

Globalization as we know it would not exist without China's transformations, which facilitated the entrée of 400 million newly disempowered laborers into the world market, thereby enabling vast transformations in global industrial and agricultural production now understood as typical of corporate globalization (Muldavin 2003). Yet, it has proven very difficult, even in the context of a putatively more open post-1989 world, for social scientific inquiry to engage this fact without falling into one of three traps engendered by state-centrism, identified by Brenner (2004). The first is *spatial fetishism*, which holds that space is timeless and static and therefore immune to the possibility of historical change that deviates from the dominant telos. The inevitability narratives and "impact models" (Hart 2006) of globalization are one example of this, which tend to overlook the dynamism between China's domestic transformations and global capital in the dialectical constitution of the global economy. The second is *methodological territorialism*, which assumes that all social relations are organized within discreetly bounded territorial containers, generally contiguous with national territory. It is through such thinking that some aspect of 'globalization' can be talked about as influencing "China" as a whole rather than, say, a discreet group of officials in a particular town who then exert power over a particular neighborhood which may or may not have links to other places within or beyond China (Bair 2009). The third trap, *methodological nationalism*, is closely related insofar as it assumes that the nation-state is a coherent unit of analysis; that social relations are homogenous across national space and are organized at the national scale. This is particularly evident in Anglophone and Sinophone discourses on "China," as though it were actually a monolithic unit driven by a coherent centralized state. The subsequent section discusses how this trap is especially evident in academic discourses within and about China.

GLOBALIZATION IN THE WEST; GLOBALIZATION IN CHINA; GLOBALIZATION AND CHINA

Critiques of globalization are not new. A rich debate around the turn of the millennium—appropriately after the first decade of living in a post-Cold War world—held that "there are many globalizations" (Kaldor et al. 2003) and that scholarship should concern itself with "globalization from below" (Portes 2000; Brecher et al. 2000) in search of "grassroots" (Appadurai 2000), or "alternative globalizations" (Maurer 2000; Fischman et al. 2005). These critiques inspired and grew out of grounded, ethnographic research into "resistance," "alternatives" "emancipation," and "subversion" or "contingency" with respect to globalization (McLaren and Jaramillo 2008; Hart 2006; Naples and Desai 2002; Gosine 2005; Tsing 2005). Yet, with very few exceptions (Ngai et al. 2009; Stalker 2000), these tales of resistance within China concern efforts directed against the state, or against the local state in cahoots with domestic capital rather than "globalization." Few scholars have argued for an epistemology built around the mutual constitution of contemporary China and globalization and fewer still for the dialectical entanglement of local sites in China with globalizing processes. There are, of course, exceptions. Broadly speaking, Swyngedouw (1997), Herod (1997), and Tsing (2005) argued for reconceptualizing globalization as produced by, through, and in dialectical tension with specific places, driven above all by local(ized) actors such as laborers and power brokers rather than an ephemeral "global" or placeless class, while Lee's (2014) groundbreaking transnational ethnographic work puts this in action between China and Zambia.

With respect to China, Muldavin (2003) argued for considering globalization in terms of China's global integration and articulation to the core processes of economic globalization: for example, the flight of Silicon Valley jobs to Beijing, the loss of US and European manufacturing jobs to China, and even the downfall of Mexico's *maquiladoras* as multinational corporations that had moved south of the US-Mexico border after NAFTA fled unionizing labor to China's eastern seaboard, flooding global markets with cheap goods that undermined manufacturing everywhere from Japan to Europe to the Americas. The crux of this analysis hinges on a refusal to "blame China" for creating these economic ills, but rather to understand the role of China's socialist transition occurring contemporaneously with the global deregulation of capital in the years preceding and following the end of the Cold War.

China's policies, laborers, and environments have played a key role in the global political economic restructuring resulting from several decades of internationally institutionalized neoliberal prescriptions harnessed by footloose capital on the one hand and China's state-supported development strategies on the other. In other words, key actors in China's state apparatus were "willing partners with global capital in a restructuring process long advocated by Western economists" (Muldavin 2003: 9) and global economic institutions. Under such circumstances, any firm determined to keep its facilities in the West rather than leveraging the global race to the bottom became a target for corporate takeover. This is understandably an immense problem with which to grapple because of the demands of a combined research focus on detailed aspects of social change among select groups in China and elsewhere, drawn together through the activities of a particular firm acting according to a contingent set of privileges and pressures. Social scientists using ethnographic and embedded research practices to focus on labor and/or firms (Yan 2008; Lee 1995; Ngai et al. 2003; Yang 1995) have excelled at tackling dimensions of this complex problem. Such inquiries have been aided by geographically minded historians (Pomeranz 2009; Arrighi et al. 2003; Perdue 2005; Han 2011) who have offered analyses exploring the longer transnational links among China, Eurasia, and the world.

Although the "Open Door" policy began in 1978, academics within China were censured against talking about globalization with accusations of being unpatriotic (Yu 2009a) because globalization was equated with Americanization and, therefore, a loss of cultural dignity. Since China's campaign to be recognized as a market economy following its accession to the WTO (Cheng 2011), there has been a growing view that globalization is inherently neutral, and just like a market economy, can work for both socialism and capitalism (Yu 2009b). In contrast to the Western framing of globalization as a capitalist process with a detailed, if often implicit and disavowed, political project, in China globalization is described as a growth-oriented historical-cultural process that must be choreographed by the socialist state in order to harness economic advantages. The result of the conflation of economic growth with globalization is that, anymore, the working definition of globalization looks similar in China and the West with the key difference that it is in China, at least discursively, enlisted to realize socialist modernization (Zemin 2002). The globalization debates published in the China's journals follow this orthodoxy, tailored to the contemporary state directives of economic development. Such discursive

practices have been necessary in order to get published (Hong 2000). Amidst all of this, there are resounding critiques of globalization as neo-liberal consumerism among Leftist scholars in China; many have relocated to Hong Kong or elsewhere overseas (Wen 2005; Zhang et al. 2012).

The persisting imaginary of globalization as Euro-American hegemony has hobbled analyses of China's role in the process of globalization. This is evident in the literature around China's "going out" strategy, which is characterized by a pervasive low-level alarmism (Kurlantzick 2008; Kaplinsky et al. 2007). Globalizing China is seen as an ongoing exception to the norm of globalization driven by the West: these happenings challenge Euro-American observers' capacities for sober assessment (especially in the popular press) because China as an *agent* of globalization is troubling insofar as China is globalizing forms of political economy that allegedly deviate from Western norms (Rebol 2009). Complicating analyses of China's agency in globalization is the fact that Beijing has taken pains to distinguish itself from the neoliberal orthodoxy associated with "globalization," z, south-south cooperation, and mutual benefit (Naidu 2007; Jilberto and Hogenboom 2010).

There is an important and growing body of research on China's overseas activities. Unfortunately, much of this research reproduces the "impact" model, as evinced by the proliferation of articles and conferences concerning "China's impact" on other parts of the developing world. The only difference here from the Western globalization discourse is that agency is attributed to China and denied other actors. This perpetuates the tendency to subsume the distinctions of African, Latin American, and such places and peoples under the category of "Third World," or "under-developed." Although these terms have been roundly critiqued, the latter is increasingly standing in for the former (Escobar 2011; Mohanty et al. 1991; Mohanty 2003; Prakesh 1990). Furthermore, critical inquiry across these alliances is burdened by a long-standing marginalization of China, Africa, and Latin America in turn across multiple Area studies disciplines. This "persisting symmetrical neglect" (Large 2008) of Africa in studies of China's foreign relations, for example, as well as of China in studies of Middle Eastern, Latin American, or other Area studies fields reflects yet another Cold War legacy that is slowly changing post-1989, driven by interest and alarm at China's overseas activities. It is nonetheless telling that that Euro-American overseas activities continue to be understood as "globalization," while China's overseas activities are differentiated as "China's overseas activities."

CHINA IN THE WEST; CHINA IN CHINA

Essentializing "China" has been conspicuous in "China studies" in China and the West. Based on observation, there are far more Chinese scholars fluent in Western languages than there are Western scholars fluent in Chinese. It is much more common for a non-Chinese researcher to rely on translators in order to carry out their research in China than for Chinese researchers to rely on translators to conduct their research in the Euro-American world. This is in part attributable to the divergent approaches to language education which have only recently begun to change: it is common for Chinese researchers to have had training in Western languages, history, and culture since primary school, whereas until recently in the United States the process of learning the language, history, and culture of China typically did not begin until college or graduate school. Walder (2004) noted that the task of becoming a China *specialist* under such conditions was hardly realistic, requiring in a few short years "mastering a punishingly difficult language, familiarizing oneself with a history and culture of extraordinary subtlety, variability, and historical depth, *while at the same time* learning the canon of theory and research in one's discipline and the skills necessary to pose significant questions and design research." Instead, most ·"emerged from the process with only rudimentary language skills, a stereotyped set of cultural traits of 'the Chinese' or of China's 'modern historical dilemmas'" (316–317, emphasis original). The result of this was "an unwitting 'occidentalism,' an orientation that led us *implicitly* to compare what we observed in China with a stereotyped textbook image of 'the West.'" This explains much of the research orientations on China which have been overwhelmingly concerned with "modernization," "development" "growth," and "democratization," processes as measured against the yardstick of a highly idealized notion of these processes in the West (O'Brien and Li 2006).

Because China was effectively closed to foreign researchers until the final years of the Cold War, many Western specialists of China during the third quarter of the 20th century had never been to the People's Republic of China (cf. Walder 2004). They relied instead on translations provided by the BBC World Service and the U.S. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, interviews with émigrés, and what could be gleaned from visits to Hong Kong and Taiwan. Although China's government fostered educational exchange students from other Third World and developing countries on a scale and duration unparalleled by other states during the

Cold War, very few first world westerners were able to conduct research in China until well into the 1980s. With the end of the Cold War, government and private foundations in the United States expanded funding opportunities to send Euro-American students to China; Chinese universities sought to send more students abroad and to open opportunities to Western scholars. Although record numbers of Euro-Americans are learning and attaining professional proficiency in Chinese, the legacies of this cruder approach to understanding China in relation to the rest of the world—a crudeness that lends itself to the more simplistic narratives of economic globalization—will take some time to overcome.

There is still a lot of work to be done to liberate social scientific inquiry about China from the normativities of neoliberal globalization. As Breslin (2011: 1323) points out, the growing interest in the "China model" as something distinct simply ignores the norm of "strong state developmentalism over history." As noted, ignoring the "relatively well-trodden statist development path" is attributable to the narratives of exceptionalism surrounding China, within both Anglophone and Chinese scholarship.

In China, China studies is a vibrant field known as *zhongguoxue* or, literally, Central Country Studies. Legal and dynastic records dating back 5000 years, a literary canon dating back 3000 years, and religious sites dating back over 1000 years provide ample material for research, especially within a political context intent on emphasizing cultural and civilizational exceptionalism (Zhang 2013). There are vast bodies of work, and lively debates concerned with historical, literary, and cultural details of such subtlety that are unknown outside of Chinese-language scholarship simply because it has thus far proven difficult in the extreme for a non-native to acquire the requisitely deep cultural frame of reference to identify, much less engage in, certain specialized discourses (Klinger under review). Yet, there are limits: China studies within China is no picnic, either. Historical revisionism has been state practice since dynastic times,[3] and there are few protections for "academic freedom" for political or historical matters deemed "too sensitive" to stray from the party line. Scholars have a duty to serve their government, which means generating research to support state mandates (Hong 2000).

Part of the revisionism now includes reinterpreting China's global integration. Whereas the post-Cold War years emphasized a qualified importance of studying international norms, a growing number of books, and commentaries by public intellectuals in China are reframing China's rise away from the discourses of global integration toward an essentialized

ethno-national telos. These narratives maintain that due to China's unique civilization—particularly its imperial past—China is culturally destined not only to rise, but to rule Asia and the world (Callahan 2012) according to a hybrid of "traditional Chinese values," command capitalism, and eth-nonational distinction. Notably, this line of thinking reaches back beyond the revolutionary era of the twentieth century to the "century of humili-ation" at the hands of colonial powers while conjuring idealized visions of the imperial past to stimulate feelings of longing for and entitlement to a resurgent golden age where China rules all under heaven (Liu 2010; Yan 2011). In this sort of political and historical scholarship, the epis-temic break between China and globalization is simultaneously reified, subsumed, and transcended. It is reified insofar as inquiry is structured in order to furnish evidence of China's exceptionalism, and subsumed because such narratives do not take responsibility for China's agency in producing the current global order. The transcendence occurs not because the uneasy relationship between "China" and "globalization" epistemolo-gies has been reconciled, but because in the future-present imagined by these texts, the Euro-American hegemon is irrelevant.

CONCLUSION

In his now infamous lecture, Fukuyama (1989) stated, "The triumph of the West, of the Western idea, is evident first of all in the total exhaustion of viable systematic alternatives to Western liberalism." This way of thinking did not, and could not, account for the transformations unfolding within China, or how post-9/11, post-2008 Euro-American countries would eviscerate democratic civil liberties in service of gargantuan growth in the military, surveillance, and transnational finance sectors. The Tiananmen square demonstrations, wishfully misread by the Western press as a stand for American-style liberal democracy (Kristof 1989a, b), were in fact a coalescence of students, workers, and immiserated farmers against a dete-riorating social contract. The former two were agitated by vulnerability and exploitation engendered by the market transition (Walder and Gong 1993), while the latter had come to Beijing to petition the central gov-ernment to ameliorate the landlessness, poverty, and vulnerability that emerged in the wake of decollectivization of rural communes. It was, in fact, a demonstration against the dismantling of state commitments and the socialist safety net (Muldavin 1993). This epochal misreading did, however, facilitate social scientific inquiry by stimulating massive new

funding allocations to study questions of democratization, consumerism, and the formation of civil society in China. These particular material and ideological conditions encouraged an intense interest in stories of "resistance" against (Lee and Hsing 2010), or negotiation with (Hsing 2010), the heavy-handedness of the state; within these practices perhaps lay the seeds of democratic transition driven by an emergent rights-consciousness among the populace (O'Brien and Li 2006).

What has become clear, however, is that Western hubris about the inevitability of democratic liberalization did not anticipate the way in which developed and developing countries would emulate certain aspects of China's state capitalism in light of the Asian country's economic growth amidst intensifying unrest around social inequality around the globe. There is growing debate around this "cross-fertilization" and the "China model," (Fukuyama and Zhang 2014; Naughton 2010; Huang 2011), which is provisionally framed as "statist globalization" (Harris 2009). The most significant methodological effects of this include a revival of critical comparative methods in the wake of the post-modern critique of positivist approaches (May 2011; Ragin and Amoroso 2011). The purpose of comparative methods is not to identify the objective truths of homogenous bounded units, but rather to understand the relational and world historical processes shaping what are generally understood to be vastly different places (cf. Arrighi et al. 2003; Hart 2002; Pomeranz 2009). The outcomes of such inquiries, though relatively few as of yet, are promising. Such a necessarily broader and more reflexive research approach would not have been possible, arguably, without the extreme Western triumphalism following the end of the Cold War and its subsequent critique; soul-searching among China's academics amidst the country's transformation; and the growing recognition that Western liberalism is but one of many idealizations informing knowledge and practice and, therefore, an insufficient rubric around which to structure social scientific inquiry.

NOTES

1. The key conundrum has been how to globalize the power of capital without globalizing the power of the working class (cf. Harvey 1995).
2. It is the spirit of internationalism, the spirit of communism, from which every Chinese Communist must learn…. We must unite with the proletariat of all the capitalist countries, with the proletariat of Japan, Britain, the United States, Germany, Italy and all other capitalist countries, before it is

possible to overthrow imperialism, to liberate our nation and people, and to liberate the other nations and peoples of the world. This is our internationalism, the internationalism with which we oppose both narrow nationalism and narrow patriotism. "In Memory of Norman Bethune" (December 21, 1939), Selected Works, Vol. II, p. 337.

3. A Manchurian studies scholar at the China Academy of Social Sciences has devoted his career to identifying omissions and revisions in Qing dynasty translations between Manchu and Mandarin records; many of the records, some three hundred years old, are still considered "too sensitive" for scholarly inquiry (Author interviews 2013).

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