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during the conflict portrayed as a Christ-like martyr. While political
decisions in the Balkans are frequently based more on mythic distor–
tions rather than real events, reality is often the spark that is used by
demagogues
to
inflame the popular will. The horrors of Bosnia, for
example, may well have had their origin in an emotional speech given
by Slobodan Milosovic at a festival held in
1987
commemorating the
Battle of Kosovo. With the economy of Yugoslavia wobbling and its cit–
izens disillusioned and restless for new leadership, Milosovic-who
seems determined to pursue his ultra-nationalistic, ultra-ethnic ideology
to lunatic extremes-returned
to
the Kosovo mythos to deflect attention
from his own weakening power base, proclaiming passionately, "Every
nation has a love which eternally warms its heart. For Serbs, it is
Kosovo." Two years later, the Constitution that had given Kosovo vir–
tually independent status from Yugoslavia was revoked, and the Kosovo
Liberation Army (KLA) began to rebel using what amounted to terror–
ist tactics at times and stirring up old ethnic rivalries throughout the
Balkan region. As Miranda Vickers observed in her book
Between Serb
and Albanian: A History of Kosovo,
"Everything started with Kosovo,
and everything will end there." Yet, when the Dayton Accords were
hammered out, the issues pertaining
to
Kosovo itself were largely
ignored, and consequently the conflict between Serbs and the Muslims
in Kosovo re-emerged, like one of the Hydra's multiple heads.
It
was, in part, due to a memorandum drafted early in the conflict
by u.S. envoy Robert Gelbart that characterized the KLA as terrorists
which shaped our policy, or rather our lack of policy, toward the
region, and contributed
to
our failure
to
act with force as soon as we
should have. Added to this was the fact that u.S. Ambassador Reyer–
son notified high officials in the Albanian government in
1992
that the
United States would cut off aid to the country if Salie Berisha were not
re-elected Prime Minister, not only because the U.S. did not want the
Communists to return to power, but also because Berisha was playing
a hands-off policy toward Kosovo. Of course, the fact that our Euro–
pean NATO allies believed this was a matter for them to handle, since
it was occurring on their doorstep, also accounted for paralyzing the
collective public will
to
intervene in the conflict. That the Muslims
were portrayed by the media as "ethnic Albanians," which tended to
make it appear as if they were merely a minority, rather than the major–
ity of the population in Kosovo also added to blurring the issues
involved in the conflict and
to
dulling public opinion against interven–
tion. Had the media described the dispute accurately as one between
Christians and Muslims, the larger dimensions of the conflict might not
