

## 16 The Critique of Pure Reason and Continental Philosophy

### Heidegger's Interpretation of Transcendental Imagination

#### I. INTRODUCTION

The *Critique of Pure Reason* has been a constant source of inspiration for philosophers on the European continent for well over a century. In Germany, Kant's theoretical outlook had a noticeable impact even on thinkers struggling to distance themselves from Neo-Kantian thinking. Husserl's controversial recasting of his phenomenological project along transcendental lines inherited from Kant is still evident in Heidegger's early critical revisions of Husserl's method.<sup>1</sup> For Jaspers, "the fate of philosophy hinges on our attitude toward Kant," more precisely, on our capacity to differentiate the critical method from the uncritical elements of Kant's system.<sup>2</sup>

In France, the focus on Kant's theoretical philosophy is no less prevalent, if more critical. Sartre crafts his account of phenomenon, transcendence, selfhood, and others in direct confrontation with Kant's conceptions of them.<sup>3</sup> Similarly, by locating the transcendental

For careful and critical readings of an earlier version of this chapter, I am grateful to Alfredo Ferrarin and Manfred Kuehn.

<sup>1</sup> Though the influence of Kant's theoretical philosophy on Husserl's transcendental turn (circa 1907) is controversial, Husserl clearly extols its legacy in "Kant und die Idee der Transzendentalphilosophie" (1924), see Edmund Husserl, *First Philosophy* (1923/24), ed. R. Boehm (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1956), 286; Iso Kern, *Husserl und Kant. Eine Untersuchung über Husserls Verhältnis zu Kant und zum Neukantianismus* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964), 28–31.

<sup>2</sup> Karl Jaspers, *The Great Philosophers*, tr. Ralph Manheim (New York: Harcourt Brace & World, 1962), 380; *Philosophy*, tr. E. B. Ashton, Volume I (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969) 2, 79–83; see Raymond Langley, "Kantian Continuities in Jaspers" in *Karl Jaspers*, eds. Joseph Koterski and Raymond Langley (Amherst, NY: Humanities, 2003), 193–204.

<sup>3</sup> Jean-Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, tr. Hazel Barnes (New York: Philosophical Library, 1956), xviii–l, lix, 133, 148, 225–230; *The*

conditions of knowledge in the lived body's interaction with its environment, Merleau-Ponty conceives his work as a radical revision of Kant's philosophy.<sup>4</sup> In *Kant's Critical Philosophy* ("a book about an enemy"), Deleuze attempts to show how a different hierarchical order of faculties dominates each *Critique*, but – to Kant's credit – without suppressing their differences or neglecting human finitude.<sup>5</sup> Despite arguing for a critical inversion of Kant's Enlightenment project, Foucault insists that his own work is critical in a manner analogous to its Kantian sense and framed by Kant's conception of the transcendental.<sup>6</sup> Derrida, in his deconstructive efforts to show that anything like a transcendent legitimation must always be "deferred," repeatedly notes analogies with Kant's transcendental moves in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, while freely availing himself of its terminology.<sup>7</sup>

*Transcendence of the Ego*, tr. Forrest Williams and Robert Kirkpatrick (New York: Noonday, 1957), 32–35, 43f, 54.

<sup>4</sup> Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, tr. Colin Smith (London: Routledge, 1962), ix–xviii, 60ff, 218ff, 301–304; M. C. Dillon, "Apriority In Kant and Merleau-Ponty," *Kant-Studien*, 78 (1987): 403–423.

<sup>5</sup> Gilles Deleuze, *Negotiations*, 1972–1990, tr. Martin Joughin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 6; *Kant's Critical Philosophy*, tr. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993); Deleuze returns to the *Critique of Pure Reason* in the 1978 Cours Vincennes "Synthesis and Time" ([www.webdeleuze.com](http://www.webdeleuze.com/)).

<sup>6</sup> Michel Foucault, *Essential Works*, tr. Robert Hurley and others, *Volume One* (New York: New Press, 1997), 303–319; see Gary Gutting, *Michel Foucault's Archaeology of Scientific Reason* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 2f, 182–185, 198–201, 262; Christina Hendricks, "Foucault's Kantian critique: Philosophy and the Present," *Philosophy & Social Criticism*, 34/4 (2008): 357–382; and Marc Diaballah, *Kant, Foucault, and Forms of Experience* (London: Taylor & Francis Group, 2008).

<sup>7</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Dissemination*, tr. Barbara Johnson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), 168; "Difference, the disappearance of any original presence, is at once the condition of the possibility and the condition of the impossibility of truth." See Stephen Watson, "Regulations: Kant and Derrida at the End of Metaphysics," in *Deconstruction and Philosophy*, ed. John Sallis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), pp. 71–86; and Daniel W. Smith, "Deleuze and Derrida, Immanence and Transcendence" in *Between Deleuze and Derrida*, eds. Paul Patton and John Protevi (London: Continuum, 2003), p. 65n18. Like many French thinkers, Lyotard draws more inspiration from the *Critique of the Power of Judgment* than from the *Critique of Pure Reason*, but construes Kant's analysis of knowledge's a priori conditions as, ironically, a precursor to the delegitimizing revelation of science's language games; *The Postmodern Condition*, tr. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), 38ff.

Yet for all the attention paid to Kant's theoretical philosophy by prominent "Continental Philosophers," only Heidegger offers an interpretation of the entire *Critique of Pure Reason*. In *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* (1929, hereafter *KPM*) and five different lecture courses from 1926 to 1936 (across his self-proclaimed metaphysical and post-metaphysical phases), Heidegger pores over practically every passage in the *Critique*.<sup>8</sup> According to Heidegger, *KPM* arose as misinterpretations of *Being and Time* (1927) mounted, and he noticed in Kant's doctrine of schematism a connection between the traditional problem of being ("the problem of categories") and the phenomenon of time, leading him to interpret Kant as "an advocate for the question of being" that Heidegger was posing (XIV/xv-xvii).<sup>9</sup> Heidegger views his subsequent writings on the *Critique* – the 1935–36 lectures on the System of Principles and the 1961 essay "Kant's Thesis about Being" – as attempts to "take back" the "overinterpretation" in *KPM* (XIV/xvii).<sup>10</sup> Leaving behind the analyses of subjectivity in *KPM*, Heidegger is bent in these later works on demonstrating how Kant's allegedly meager and overly constrained conception of being as the objectivity of objects is central to the modern, metaphysical concept of being.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>8</sup> For a review of Heidegger's "commentary," encompassing articles, books, and posthumously published lectures, see my "Heidegger's Kantian Turn: Notes to his Commentary on the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*," *Review of Metaphysics* 45/2 (1991): 329–361.

<sup>9</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, *Gesamtausgabe*, Band 3 (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1991). All numbers placed alone in parentheses in this chapter refer to this edition, followed by a slash and the corresponding page numbers of *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, tr. Richard Taft (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990). All translations, however, are my own.

<sup>10</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Die Frage nach dem Ding: Zu Kants Lehre von den transzendenten Grundbegriffen*, ed. Petra Jaeger, *Gesamtausgabe*, Band 41 (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1984; separately published in 1962); English translation: *What is a Thing?* tr. W. B. Barton, Jr. and Vera Deutsch (Chicago: Regnery, 1967); "Kant's These über das Sein" (1961) in *Wegmarken, 1919–1958*, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, *Gesamtausgabe*, Band 9 (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1996); "Kant's Thesis about Being," *Pathmarks*, ed. William McNeill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 337–363.

<sup>11</sup> "Kant's These über das Sein," 288f; see too, Martin Heidegger, *Nietzsche II* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1961), 231f, and *Der Satz vom Grund* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1978), 115. Heidegger likely thought that the changed ("*seynsgeschichtliche*") focus of his subsequent readings sufficed to take back the *Being and Time*-dominated "*Überdeutung*" – though in these readings Kant comes out even worse, as the purveyor of a theoretical conception of

Nonetheless, of all Heidegger's studies of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, *KPM* remains arguably the most important, not only for its impact on others but also for its controversial interpretation of the Transcendental Analytic. Heidegger himself continued to recommend the book, despite its shortcomings, publishing a fourth edition as late as 1973. Yet, in contrast to their Continental European counterparts, Anglo-American scholars have paid far less attention to *KPM*.<sup>12</sup> This chapter contributes to making up this deficit by reviewing *KPM*'s central contention that the Transcendental Analytic succeeds only by according transcendental imagination the foundational role in all objective cognition. Heidegger's interpretation has, I will show, not only a strong textual basis but also a distinctively phenomenological and realist character that bears heavily on the question of its plausibility. In conclusion, I also flag a fundamental limitation of the interpretation as a reading of the Transcendental Analytic, even if that phenomenological realism is granted.

Before turning to Heidegger's interpretation itself, however, a word is in order about the expression "phenomenological realism," since the coherency of conjoining these notions may be less than obvious and since Heidegger rejects both realism and idealism as ways of characterizing his own philosophical endeavors, then and later. He regards talk of realism or idealism as an outgrowth of a misguided epistemology – misguided because it rests on an ontologically naïve presumption about the nature of the subject – object relation. In this connection, Heidegger singles out the all too precipitous inquiry by Kant and his latter day "epigones" (the Neo-Kantians) into the ground of the possibility of the relation of consciousness to its object.<sup>13</sup> By centering the analysis of human existence in being-in-the-world rather than in being conscious, Heidegger attempts in *Being and Time* to supply the requisite fundamental ontology and, in the process, to remove the motivation for realist or idealist theories of knowledge.

the being of beings as the objectivity of objects, leaving claims for practical reason in a state of bad faith.

<sup>12</sup> Notable exceptions: L. W. Beck's review of *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* in *Philosophical Review* 72/3 (1963): 396–398; Charles Sherover, *Heidegger, Kant and Time* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1971); Wayne Waxman, *Kant's Model of the Mind* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); Béatrice Longuenesse, *Kant and the Capacity to Judge* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998); Gary Banham, *Kant's Transcendental Imagination* (London: Palgrave, 2006).

<sup>13</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Metaphysische Anfangsgeschichte der Logik*, ed. Klaus Held, *Gesamtausgabe*, Band 26, second edition (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1990), 163f.

Yet while it is wrongheaded or, at least, misleading to characterize Heidegger's own philosophical standpoint as realist, his reading of the epistemology of the *Critique of Pure Reason* has unmistakable affinities with a self-styled realist interpretation that he commends to this student – that of Alois Riehl.<sup>14</sup> Riehl (in)famously contends that, for Kant, “the existence of things is given, independent of consciousness,” that “perceptions are the appearances of things, existing in themselves,” and that Kant’s idealism applies solely to space and time, as a means of restricting “pure knowledge,” but not to logical functions and the concepts of things in general, corresponding to those functions.<sup>15</sup> “The actuality of things intuited in these forms [i.e., space and time] remains unaffected in this doctrine; even more, it is placed beyond doubt by the latter. The ideality of space refutes the idealism of external things and proves ‘dualism.’”<sup>16</sup> At the same time, Riehl insists that the dualism here is not a “doubling of objects” but the two meanings of “the same object”: as appearance in relation to sensory intuition and as thing in itself “apart from this relationship.”<sup>17</sup> As will become evident later, Heidegger’s interpretation echoes each of these contentions – even as he rejects the

<sup>14</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Phänomenologische Interpretationen von Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, ed. Ingrid Gölzl, *Gesamtausgabe*, Band 25, second edition (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1987), 8; Heidegger’s criticisms of Riehl’s proposed “corrections” of the wording in certain passages further underscores his attentiveness to Riehl’s approach, *KPM* 84n118/57n118, 182n252/124n252.

<sup>15</sup> Alois Riehl, *Der Philosophische Kritizismus*, erster Band, zweite, neu verfasste Auflage (Leipzig: Engelmann, 1908), 395–398, 403–413, 561, 571f; zweiter Band, zweiter Theil (Leipzig: Engelmann, 1887), 171. See, too, Michael Heidelberger, “Kantianism and Realism: Alois Riehl (and Moritz Schlick)” in *The Kantian Legacy in Nineteenth Century Science*, ed. Michael Friedman and Alfred Neumann (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006), 227–248. It bears noting that Heidegger’s enthusiasm for this realist but Kantian approach, critical of empiricism, is evident in his earliest academic publication, “*Das Problem der Realität in der neuzeitlichen Philosophie*,” which extols the work of Oswald Külpe, the other major figure (besides Riehl) associated with the Neo-Kantian realism (though Heidegger adds that Eduard von Hartmann’s transcendental idealism prepares the way for this development); see Martin Heidegger, *Frühe Schriften*, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, Gesamtausgabe, Band 1 (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1978), 1–15.

<sup>16</sup> *Der philosophische Kritizismus*, erster Band (1908), 404; see, too, Oswald Külpe, *Immanuel Kant*, dritte Auflage (Leipzig: Teubner, 1912), 75: “*Denn warum mußte die Subjektivität der Bestimmungsmittel eine Erkenntnis der Realitäten, wie sie an sich sind, unmöglich machen!*”

<sup>17</sup> *Der philosophische Kritizismus*, erster Band (1908), 406.

proposition that the primary project of the *Critique* is to provide an epistemology of science.<sup>18</sup>

Nor are the affinities of his approach with Riehl’s realistic interpretation inconsistent with the investigations that Heidegger considers paradigmatic of Husserl’s phenomenology – that is, the phenomenology of the *Logical Investigations*, prior to Husserl’s infamous transcendental idealistic turn. For example, Heidegger interprets intentionality as the most decisive discovery of Husserl’s phenomenology precisely because Husserl does not confuse the object of intentionality (consciousness) with a representation of its object, a confusion that is the first step on the slippery slope of idealism. Moreover, in the *Logical Investigations* and in stark contrast to Brentano, Heidegger submits, Husserl not only clearly distinguishes between the object and the content of intentionality (consciousness), but also – through his theory of the coincidence of what is meant and what is perceived – provides an account of how knowledge of the object itself (*die Sache selbst*) is possible. While phenomenology investigates the essential make-up of mental acts and contents – for example, perceiving, imagining, meaning – precisely with a view to their role in knowing, Heidegger in his commentary on the *Critique* examines through a phenomenological lens Kant’s own analysis of them. But neither that investigation nor Heidegger’s commentary entails that *objective reality* – to use a Kantian phrase favored by Riehl – is nothing more than an idea.<sup>19</sup>

## 2. THE TWO DIMENSIONS OF KPM

Heidegger’s interpretation of the *Critique of Pure Reason* has metaphysical and cognitive dimensions. He contends that it lays the groundwork for metaphysics in some sense and thereby coincides at some level with fundamental ontology, Heidegger’s own project at the time. This metaphysical dimension dominates the opening and closing sections of *KPM*.

<sup>18</sup> The mention of Riehl in this connection is telling, not only because he is arguably the Neo-Kantian most insistent on aligning Kant’s philosophical approach with contemporary scientific developments (for example, non-Euclidean geometry), but also because Cassirer presents him, for that very reason, as the author of the sort of epistemological interpretation of the *Critique* that is the very antipode and, indeed, the target of *KPM*; Ernst Cassirer, “*Bemerkungen zu Martin Heideggers Kant-Interpretation*,” *Kant-Studien XXXVI/1* (1931): 2f.

<sup>19</sup> For Heidegger’s interpretation of the phenomenology of Husserl’s *Logical Investigations* along these realist lines, see *Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs*, ed. Petra Jaeger, *Gesamtausgabe*, Band 20 (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1979), 54ff.

Within this framework, he also interprets key passages in the Transcendental Analytic, designed to demonstrate the possibility of cognition or experience of objects (A 158/B 197) – what Heidegger dubs “transcendence” (71/48) and “finite knowing” (119/81).<sup>20</sup> These metaphysical and cognitive dimensions ultimately converge since only an explanation of the possibility of transcendence (empirical knowledge of objects) can provide the grounds (the fundamental ontology) for any future metaphysics. But as a reading of the Transcendental Analytic, the cognitive dimension stands on its own and, indeed, the trenchancy of Heidegger’s interpretation as a whole turns on that reading and its account of the basic synthesis that makes experience of objects possible. Heidegger contends that the most consistent and compelling interpretation of the Transcendental Analytic (in the first edition) points, on Kant’s own terms, to the conclusion that what makes experience of objects possible can be nothing else than the transcendental imagination, rooted in a basic sort of temporality.<sup>21</sup>

Heidegger sets the stage for his argument by citing the opening sentence of the Transcendental Aesthetic:

(1) In whatever way and through whatever means a cognition may relate to objects, that through which it relates immediately to them, and at which all thought as a means is directed, is intuition. (A 19/B 33)

Heidegger glosses (1) in terms of the difference between human and divine knowing, both a kind of intuition, but differing because human beings do not create what they intuit in the process of doing so. Human knowing is finite by virtue of its dependency both upon something already there that it takes up (*hinimmt*) and upon the need to relate what it takes up to other things in the course of doing so.<sup>22</sup> Unlike the divine mind, a human mind can know only objects – that is, entities that present themselves (appear) to it – and it can only know them in a round about way (*umweg-ig*) by “running through” (thinking) more than one thing. By virtue of this discursiveness, thinking determines what is intuited “as this and that” or in view of some generality, thereby rendering it accessible and communicable to others.<sup>23</sup> Human knowing is finite because it is at once receptive and discursive – that is, an intuiting that takes something up

and can do so only by thinking it (*hinnehmende und deshalb denkende Anschauung*) (30/20). Citing Kant’s *Opus postumum* (and echoing Riehl), Heidegger adds that the difference between things in themselves and appearances is “merely subjective,” referring to different ways that infinite and finite knowing refer to “the same object,” such that “what is ‘behind the appearances’ is the same entity as the appearance” (32ff./21ff).

This emphasis on human knowing’s finitude, underscored by the primacy of an intuition at once receptive and requiring thought, introduces the central issue of the synthesis of intuiting and thinking. Merely juxtaposing them and acknowledging their interdependency hardly suffices to explain the possibility of knowing. Citing Kant’s remark that “only from the fact that they combine can knowledge arise” (A 51/B 75f), Heidegger submits that “only in the joining of both, prefigured by their structure, can a finite knowledge be what its essence demands” (36/24). The task is to understand the synthesis of these elements, not as something after the fact, but as something that allows them “to emerge in the way that they belong together and in their unity” (36/24). Since it must constitute the essential unity of pure intuitions and pure concepts that enables empirical syntheses, this synthesis is necessarily *a priori* and pure, not contingent or empirical.<sup>24</sup> That Kant entertained a fundamental synthesis in this way is supported, Heidegger suggests, by his characterization of pure intuition and pure thinking respectively as “synthetic” (59f./40). The sense in which each is synthetic requires their synthesis with each other, and that synthesis, Heidegger attempts to show, is the work of the transcendental imagination, “necessarily forming them originally themselves in the process of unifying them” (61/41).<sup>25</sup>

### 3. INTRODUCING THE SYNTHETIC FUNCTION OF THE IMAGINATION

According to Heidegger, Kant introduces the first characterization of “the original essential unity of the pure elements” with the observation that the spontaneity of our thinking requires that the “manifold

thinking “unifying” with intuition as a veritative synthesis, the basis of predicative and apophantic syntheses (27ff./18ff).

<sup>24</sup> The alleged “first stage” of Kant’s argument is his introduction of pure intuitions and concepts separately, without reference to the requisite synthesis – for Heidegger an irreversible misstep borne out by the uneven lengths of the transcendental aesthetic and transcendental logic and by the placement of that synthesis within the latter (59/40, 66ff./44ff).

<sup>25</sup> The synthesis is a constitutive condition, roughly like homeostasis in an organism, at once forming and synthesizing the elements.

<sup>20</sup> Because transcendence for Heidegger means more than cognitive experience of objects, he glosses it as “finite comportment towards entities” (71/48).

<sup>21</sup> Heidegger reconstructs Kant’s argument in five stages. The body of this chapter reviews the second, third, and fourth stages; for the remaining stages, see notes 24 and 34.

<sup>22</sup> Here, the affinities with Riehl’s and Kühle’s “critical realism” are patent.

<sup>23</sup> The intuited, Heidegger adds, is determined with a “view” to the universal, though the latter remains unthematized; he interprets this process of

[provided by the pure intuition of space and time] first be gone through in a certain way, taken up, and bound together in order to produce an instance of knowledge from it. I name this action 'synthesis' " (A 77/B 102). Thinking requires what pure intuition supplies ("without which it would be completely empty") but only if it is first "gone through and gathered up" – that is, only if there has been a synthesis of it (62/42). Indeed, all analysis, Kant contends, presupposes the synthesis of a given manifold. Since that synthesis is what combines elements into a content at all, "it [that synthesis] is therefore the first thing to which we have to pay attention if we want to judge the first origin of our knowledge" (A 77/B 103). After asserting this primacy of synthesis over analysis, Kant attributes synthesis in general to the imagination:

(II) Synthesis in general is ... the mere effect of the imagination, of a blind, though indispensable function of the soul, without which we would have no cognition at all, but of which we are seldom even conscious. (A 78/B 105)

From (II) and its context, Heidegger infers that the imagination "brings about" (*erwirkt*) every synthetic structure essential to knowing (63/42). It is thus the imagination that synthesizes the unified whole represented in a pure intuition, with a view to a guiding unity provided by a pure concept. In the process, it secures for pure concepts the necessary cognitive traction (63/42). Kant's expositions of pure intuitions and of pure concepts of the understanding reveal in each case a synthesis – ultimately their synthesis with each other – that depends upon the imagination. The imagination is accordingly indispensable and irreducible to the functions of intuition and thinking in knowing. To underscore the distinct role of the imagination, Heidegger cites Kant's identification of the three parts of "the complete essence of pure knowledge" (63/42): the manifold of pure intuition, its synthesis by the imagination, and the concept of the understanding that lends this pure synthesis unity (A 78/B 104).

Cautioning against a wooden conception of the relations among these three parts, Heidegger emphasizes that the manifolds unified in pure intuition and accordingly conceived do not simply meet but fit together (*sich fügen*) in the synthesis produced by the imagination. Pure intuition and pure understanding alike have a synthetic character thanks to their fit in the imagination's mediating synthesis. For its part, the imagination is ubiquitous, indispensable, and irreducible to intuition or understanding because it synthesizes them.

Yet even if the passages cited corroborate Kant's acknowledgment of the features of the imagination mentioned, Heidegger recognizes that these initial characterizations of the fundamental, synthetic role of the imagination are merely the first step to establishing its nature. As one might expect, matters become clearer in the transcendental deduction,

the demonstration that the pure concepts of the understanding make experience of objects possible.<sup>26</sup>

#### 4. THE SYNTHETIC FUNCTION OF PURE IMAGINATION IN THE TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION (A)

Reiterating his realist construal of human knowing's dependence upon something given, not created in intuition, Heidegger interprets objects as something "already on hand" (70/47). Explaining how knowledge of objects is possible ("the inner possibility of transcendence" in Heidegger's jargon) entails explaining how we are able to turn to the objects in such a way that they confront us at all – that is, how we are able to orient ourselves to them as objects. Herein lies the role of pure concepts. As original representations of unity that themselves unify, they represent the constraints – the rules – that enable something to present itself as an object.<sup>27</sup> The transcendental deduction's task is to demonstrate how they do so, how pure concepts dictate what can be experienced and thus serve as constitutive conditions of the objecthood of objects (the possibility of knowing them). Heidegger interprets the third section of the first-edition deduction to demonstrate "how pure understanding and pure intuition are dependent upon one another *a priori*" (77/52) and, more importantly, upon "the pure synthesis" that makes their connection possible (78/52f). Heidegger follows Kant's way of proceeding (a) from the understanding (A 116–120) and then (b) "from below" (A 119) – that is, from intuition (A 120–128).

(a) *From pure apperception to imagination.* The "first way" begins with Kant's remarks on the "necessity of consciousness of the identity of oneself" for the knowledge of a manifold synthesized by it and the equivalence of that identical self-consciousness to "a consciousness of the equally necessary unity of the synthesis of all appearances according to concepts" (A 108). As Heidegger puts it, in representing a unity, it is apparent to the representing itself that it is binding itself to the unity, maintaining itself as the same throughout the process of representing the unity (78f/53). Only in this tact apparentness to itself that it is this self-sustaining process of representing unity ("pure apperception") can

<sup>26</sup> Equivalently, the deduction's task is to demonstrate the categories' "objective reality" – to be distinguished, Heidegger submits, from their "existence" or "objective validity" (*quid iuris*) (85–88/57ff).

<sup>27</sup> "The understanding, as a whole, provides in advance what is at odds with the arbitrary. Representing unity originally and as unifying, it places before itself a constraint that regulates in advance every possible [gathering] together" (76/50).



something confront it. Pure self-consciousness as this oblique "turning toward itself" (*Selbstzuwendung*) is a necessary condition for the fact that something confronted, in Kant's words, "matters to us" (A 116). In this way, Heidegger interprets the sense in which "the pure concept as consciousness of unity in general, is necessarily pure self-consciousness" and "pure understanding acts as transcendental apperception in originally holding a unity up to itself" (79/53).

Heidegger's interpretation, here as elsewhere, is unmistakably phenomenological. He labors to retrieve the lived but overlooked senses of Kant's nomenclature, insofar as they are essential to cognition. Hence he construes concepts generally as unities that we keep in view, for the most part implicitly, in the process of unifying some manifold. He similarly characterizes pure apperception as the tacit obviousness of this process that can always be made explicit (79f/53f).<sup>28</sup>

From this phenomenological perspective, Heidegger poses the question crucial for his interpretation of these passages: what is represented in the unity? Since the understanding cannot itself be the source of what is united, it must "await" the latter, albeit in a way enabling such an encounter. In other words, the pure concepts of the understanding are directed toward the unifying of what is not yet unified in itself (79/53f). For this reason, Heidegger submits, transcendental apperception "presupposes or includes a synthesis" (A 118).

While Kant supposedly often wavers in determining precisely the unity's relation to the unifying synthesis,<sup>29</sup> he attributes the relevant synthesis to the imagination:

(III) The principle of the necessary unity of the pure (productive) synthesis of imagination prior to apperception is thus the ground of the possibility of all cognition, especially that of experience. (A 118)

According to Heidegger, the term 'prior' in this passage – which he takes as following from (II) – does not signify a synthesis taking place before transcendental apperception or obtaining on its own somehow. Nor could it mean anything of the sort, given the transcendental character of the synthesis. Yet, insofar as a pure concept of the understanding is "a unifying unity, that is to say, the representing is in itself unifying," something must be given *a priori* for this unifying to take place (80f/54f).

<sup>28</sup> Similarly, Kant writes "synopsis" (A 94). Heidegger submits, to capture how pure intuition originally forms (*bildet*) a discernible unity while tacitly holding the manifold "together" in that (142/97f).

<sup>29</sup> Kant wavers between asserting that the unity "belongs together" with the synthesis and that the unity is presupposed by it; the first alternative is, Heidegger contends, the "essentially necessary" one, since "the unity is from the outset unifying" (80/54).

(b) *From intuition to imagination.* Because perceptions are "encountered in a dispersed way and individually" (A 120), they need to be bundled – that is, related to one another, and for them to be bundled, their relations must be represented from the outset. Insofar as the issue is the pure relations – that is, the sorts of relations formed by a finite knower – as conditions of the possibility of knowing any empirical relations, these relations are those afforded by the pure intuition of time (A 99). The power of initially forming such relations (*Verhältnisse bilden*) in the course of representing them is the power of pure imagination (*Einbildungskraft*) (82/56). In his way, Heidegger glosses Kant's own conclusion "that there is an active capacity for synthesis of this manifold, that we call 'imagination'" (A 120). The imagination bundles the manifold in a rule-governed rather than haphazard manner (83/56). The resulting horizon of constraints contains the pure affinity among appearances – thereby explaining Kant's remark "that even the affinity of appearances becomes possible only by means of the transcendental function of the imagination" (A 123). At the same time, insofar as the imagination's temporal synthesis of perceptions is *a priori*, it must involve a constant representing of unity in itself – namely, "the standing and persisting I [of pure apperception]" (A 123). Just as the first way demonstrates the dependency of transcendental apperception (pure understanding) on pure imagination, so the second way demonstrates the dependency of pure intuition in its transcendental function on pure imagination.

(IV) We therefore have a pure imagination, as a fundamental faculty of the human soul, that grounds all cognition *a priori*. . . . Both extremes, namely sensibility and understanding, must necessarily be connected by means of this transcendental function of the imagination, since otherwise the former would to be sure yield appearances but not objects of an empirical cognition, hence there would be no experience. (A 124)

Like (III), this passage affirms that the relevant synthesis by pure imagination makes experience – that is, empirical cognition of objects (for Heidegger, "transcendence") – possible at all.

##### 5. SYNTHESIZING BY WAY OF SCHEMATIZING

Heidegger attempts to drive home his thesis about the unifying function of transcendental imagination by turning next to the Schematism chapter, the "core" of the *Critique* (89/60; 113/77). Kant makes it clear that the task of a transcendental schema, as a "mediating representation," is to provide a category with a sensory character (A 138/B 177). With this task in mind, Heidegger considers ordinary senses of accomplishing this

by picturing or imagining what something falling under the concept looks like. Heidegger claims, albeit without documentation, that Kant uses the term *Bild* ("image" or "picture") in three senses of "look" (*Anblick*): the immediate look of some entity – for example, the New York skyline; a look in the sense of a copy – for example, a photo of that skyline; and the look of something in general – for example, that photo as a picture of an urban skyline.<sup>30</sup> A picture can be said to picture a concept in this third sense, showing "how something appears 'in general', in the one aspect that holds for many" (94/64). We are interested in the look of this skyline only as an instance of how skylines in general look – or, better, how they have to look according to our concept of skyline. What counts as a possible picture of a skyline serves as an "advance sketch" of how skylines look as a rule, not as a list of features but as a means of outlining and highlighting what is generally meant by "skyline" (95/65).

On this interpretation, a concept is the rule for a possible look; equivalently, it sketches in advance that aspect of any possible look that accords with the rule (95/65). To be a concept at all, it must be rendered sensory in this attenuated sense. A concept affords neither an immediate intuitive look nor any free-floating mental content as such. Far from being something grasped in itself, a conceptual unity serves as a preview (*Vorblick*) that rules or governs only as long as we do not look directly at it. "The representing of the process of the rule-governedness [*Regelung*] as such is the genuinely conceptual representing" (96//65). The specific way this takes place is the work of the imagination. A schema, produced by the imagination, represents how, as Heidegger puts it, the rule dictates itself onto the look that presents itself (*wie sie sich ... in den darstellenden Anblick hineinbildet*). As Kant himself notes, the schema, though a product of the imagination, is not itself an image but instead represents how the imagination produces the relevant image.

(V) Now this representation of a general procedure of the imagination for providing a concept with its image is what I call the schema for this concept. (A 140/B 179f)

Cognition requires conception but concepts can only play a role in cognition thanks to their respective schemata, products of the imagination. The schema for an empirical concept (for example, a house) or a mathematical concept (for example, a triangle) is a rule for producing an image

precisely as a possible instance – one of potentially many – of the relevant concept. To distinguish this sense of "image" from others, Heidegger designates it a "schema-image." A schema-image is necessarily different from any arbitrary empirical look (*Anblick*) of a house as well as from any image or copy (*Abbild*) of that look (and *mutatis mutandis* for the mathematical concept of triangle). Indeed, only a schema, Heidegger submits, produces the sort of prefigured, regulated look that makes it possible to identify that look of a house or that aspect of a triangle at all. Kant claims that a concept immediately refers to a schema and, on Heidegger's interpretation, it is apparent in what sense he does so.<sup>31</sup> A concept refers to its schema as the representation of how the rule – that is, the regulative unity represented by a concept – can be imagined or envisioned.<sup>32</sup>

Kant appears to contradict (V) when he claims that "the schema of a pure concept of the understanding can never be brought to any image at all" (A 142/B 181). In this claim, Heidegger submits, "image" refers to schema-images for empirical and mathematical concepts. He provides little defense of this interpretative move. To be sure, the assertion comes on the heels of glosses of schemata for empirical and mathematical concepts as Kant attempts to distinguish transcendental schemata from those other schemata. Still, Kant's assertion is unqualified: the transcendental schema can never be brought "to any image at all" (*in gar kein Bild*). Yet if forced in this respect, Heidegger's interpretation has the advantage of removing the apparent contradiction in Kant's account and preserving a clear connection among imagination, images, and schemata for pure concepts.

But then what sort of schema-image is produced by the imagination for pure concepts? Drawing on Kant's talk of a "pure image" and, in particular, of time as "the pure image of all objects of the senses in general" (A 142/B 182; A 320/B 377), Heidegger contends that time, as that pure image, is the schema-image. A schema of a pure concept of the understanding represents unities "as rules imposing themselves onto any possible look" (104/71). Given the transcendental deduction's conclusion that the categories refer necessarily to time, the look in question can only

<sup>31</sup> Here, Heidegger generalizes what Kant says of an empirical concept: "die-  
ser bezieht sich jederzeit unmittelbar auf das Schema der  
Einbildungskraft" (A 141/B 180).

<sup>32</sup> In keeping with the necessity of the synthesis of a concept with intuition for cognition, Heidegger contends in effect that concepts without schemata are blind – that is, only schematized concepts function epistemically: "What logic calls a concept is grounded in the schemata" (98/67) and "All conceptual representing is essentially schematism" (101/69).

<sup>30</sup> Heidegger also distinguishes a reproduction (*Nachbild*) – for example, a photograph – from a copy (*Abbild*) (93f/63f). He also makes the general observation that since an image of something can mean the look of it, the image can mean the look of something present, past, present, future, or non-existent (92f/63).

be the look or image of time. Heidegger accordingly reasons that the schematism of pure concepts inserts into time the rules (*hinzuzueheln*) provided by them. Not only is time the pure schema-image corresponding to the schemata of pure concepts, but time as such (that is, the schema-image produced by the schematism) presents the only possible pure view of them (104/71). In this way, Heidegger explicates Kant's contention that the transcendental schemata are "nothing but *determinations of time a priori* according to rules" (A 145/B 184) and, as such, a "transcendental product of the imagination" (A 142/B 181).<sup>33</sup>

Heidegger's gloss on transcendental schemata, like his interpretation of the imagination in the Transcendental Analytic generally, proceeds from the realist standpoint that entities are already on hand. In order for those entities to be taken up, the subject must turn toward them in the appropriate way, making the encounter possible in advance. "The turning-toward must be, in itself, a way of holding up to oneself what might present itself at all, by pre-forming [or modeling: *vorbildendes*] it" (90/61). Playing on the word "*hilden*" (which can mean imagining, picturing, and/or forming), Heidegger construes the work of the transcendental imagination as that of forming the pure preview that makes the encounter possible (and, in that sense, may be called the "horizon" for the encounter): "The pure imagination, forming a schema, provides in advance a view ('picture') of the horizon of transcendence," a view that is initially formed in the process of perceiving something but is not itself the view of any particular object (91f/62, 105/71f).<sup>34</sup>

## 6. THE ROOT SYNTHESIS OF COGNITION

Heidegger cannot ignore the fact that Kant affirms that there are only two sources of cognition, to which the two parts of the Doctrine of Elements

<sup>33</sup> Heidegger attributes Kant's scanty elaboration of the schemata to his failure to understand time more fundamentally as a form of self-affection rather than as a mere succession of nows (201/137).

<sup>34</sup> Kant's identification of the supreme principle of synthetic judgments (A 158/B 197) figures as the fifth stage in Heidegger's reconstruction of the Transcendental Analytic's basic argument. Precisely by directing itself toward entities in the sense of letting them stand opposite it, the subject forms the horizon of objectivity (118/80). This gloss of the coincidence of enabling experience and enabling experience of objects (expressed by the principle) thereby resembles Heidegger's existential analysis of the ecstatic-horizon constitutive of being-here (*Da-sein*). In addition to supplying further crucial texts about the imagination (A 155/B 194), this fifth stage provides Heidegger with the opportunity to give interpretations of the transcendental object and transcendental truth.

correspond (A 50/B 74; A 294/B 350). But Kant also identifies the imagination as one of three distinct sources of cognition (A 94, A 115, A 155/B 194) and repeatedly – as in (III)–(IV) – characterizes the transcendental imagination's fundamental role in cognition. Far from being an external source of coupling the other two basic capacities, the transcendental imagination is "a capacity of its own that forms the unity of the other two that themselves have an essential structural relation to it" (137/94).<sup>35</sup>

Heidegger is not content to demonstrate Kant's affirmation of the irreducible and indispensable synthesizing role of pure imagination. Pure imagination is foundational in an even more basic sense, to which Kant himself alludes, Heidegger contends, in the following passage:

(VII) We shall content ourselves here with the completion of our task, namely, merely outlining the *architectonic* of all cognition from pure reason, and begin only at the point where the general root of our cognitive power divides and branches out into two stems. . . . (A 835/B 863)

Elsewhere, Kant mentions two stems of human cognition, "which may perhaps arise from a common but to us unknown root" (A 15/B 29). But in (VII), Heidegger submits, that root counts for something that exists, even if Kant is content merely to gesture toward it.<sup>36</sup>

Heidegger exploits this metaphor to argue that the transcendental imagination is that common root. The use of the metaphor is bound to appear murky, especially since the relation of root to stems in this case is neither causal nor inferential. But that original synthesis, it bears recalling, supposedly underlies causal and inferential claims. Moreover, far from pretending that Kant says as much, this interpretive move explicitly aims at what Kant's basic argument allegedly points toward (*Vorweisungen*) – where even characterizing the 'imagination' as the root proves inadequate (140f/96f).<sup>37</sup> Thus the attempt to show that the basic argument of the transcendental analytic entails the rootedness of

<sup>35</sup> This fundamental role, Heidegger adds, did not escape the notice of the German idealists (137n198).

<sup>36</sup> At the same time, by eschewing "the crystal clear absolute evidence of a first principle," Kant's reference to the unknown root exemplifies "a philosophizing way of laying the foundation for philosophy" (37/25).

<sup>37</sup> Heidegger thus heralds the concluding, most speculative steps of his interpretation, glosses on both the imagination's unifying temporal character, encompassing syntheses of apprehension, recognition, and apperception (A 95–110) and its roots in time's original unfolding as sheer "self-affection" (B 67f) – the essential structure of subjectivity (176–197/120–135). A complete assessment of Heidegger's interpretation would have to weigh this thesis of the temporal roots of the



intuition and concepts in the imagination is an attempt to show what Kant was struggling to say.<sup>38</sup>

(a) *The rootedness of pure intuition in transcendental imagination.* An intuition affords a view of something, a pure intuition a view of a whole, the parts of which are nothing but limitations of it. What distinguishes a pure intuition from an empirical intuition is the fact that the content of the pure intuition originates with the corresponding activity of intuiting without any (relevant) input of the senses. Yet the process of holding the parts together, however tacit, is a synthesis and, as established in (II), every synthesis is the work of the imagination.<sup>39</sup> Hence, Heidegger concludes, "pure intuiting is, in the ground of its essence, pure imagination" (143/99). As Kant himself observes, pure space and pure time are not objects to be intuited but are nonetheless something to be intuited and, indeed, as forms; what is intuited in a pure intuition is an *ens imaginatum* (A 291/B 347). These pure intuitions are not grasped thematically – that is, as objects – in the course of experience. Instead, "they form [bilden] from the outset the pure look that serves as the horizon of empirical objects" (143/98). Interpreting pure intuitions as forming in advance this thematic look explains, Heidegger suggests, how we empirically intuit spatio-temporal things without having first to grasp spatial and temporal manifolds as such (145/99).<sup>40</sup>

(b) *The rootedness of pure understanding in transcendental imagination.* Perhaps the biggest hurdle to demonstrating the rootedness of pure understanding in the transcendental imagination is the apparent difference of thinking from intuiting and imagining. As a prelude to his argument for this rootedness, Heidegger offers several textual reasons for doubting that Kant conceives thinking as utterly cut off from intuition. He iterates the point made in (I) that the understanding is essentially "referred to" intuition, and notes Kant's identification of thinking and intuiting as species of the same genus (A 320/B 376f). Nor does logic's *a priori* status entail thinking's autonomy, since Kant himself claims that "every use of the understanding, indeed, the entire logic imagination – not, to be sure, as something that Kant intends, but as something that his basic argument calls for.

<sup>38</sup> The differences introduced in the second edition supposedly confirm that Kant "shrank back" from these implications (166f/110).

<sup>39</sup> While locating the difference between forms(s) of intuition and formal intuition in the difference between intuition's synopsis and the understanding's synthesis (146n203/100n203), Heidegger contends that the imaginative synthesis encompasses both (142/97f).

<sup>40</sup> Thus, while agreeing with the Marburg Neo-Kantians that the transcendental aesthetic is incomplete, Heidegger contends that the proper response is not to reduce intuitions to concepts but to grasp their synthesis by the imagination.

must fix on the transcendental unity of apperception" (B 133n) and we know from (IV) that the unity of apperception and understanding depend, for any *a priori* cognitive function, on the imagination. Given these considerations, Heidegger infers that "preconceptions about thinking's self-standing character," as suggested by the existence of logic as a discipline, "ought not be the standard for a decision about the possibility of an origin of pure thinking from the transcendental imagination" (149/102).

Heidegger's main argument for this origin begins with a phenomenological consideration of what the depiction of the understanding as a faculty of rules entails. "To have this capacity of rules means from the outset, in the process of representing, to hold up to oneself unities that provide the lead for every possible representative unifying" (150/103). The unities in question are the categories as *a priori* conditions of the possibility of anything that is unified in our consciousness. The categories work together (holistically) and accordingly have a distinctive affinity for one another (hence, the quantity, quality, relation, and modality expressed in any empirical judgment). "But it is necessary for them as ruling, represented unities (notions or categories) not only to be brought into play on the basis of their own affinity, but also that this affinity is grasped from the outset in a persisting unity through an even more anticipatory re-presenting of this unity" (150/103). Only in the affinity of the categories with one another as a complex of rules are they enabling unities, and this affinity must be grasped and represented from the outset as the abiding sameness of that complex. Heidegger designates the representing of this abiding sameness as the basic feature of the process of letting something stand opposite the I, a process that is equivalent to representing it in the course of turning or orienting oneself toward it. Heidegger not only equates the I here with the reflexive in the phrase "turning oneself towards," but contends that this tacit reflexivity underlies Kant's remark that the "I think" must be able to accompany all clear representations.

Heidegger is making two notable points here, albeit with insufficient argumentation. The I only is what it is in the "I think," interpreted as a tacit reflexivity. The essence of the I, like that of pure thinking, lies in this pure – unthematic – consciousness-of-itself that in turn can be illuminated only on the basis of the way the self is – i.e., behaving in this way or that (including cognitively) toward something. In other words, self-consciousness presupposes a self, and not vice versa. By the same token, (and this is the second, equally phenomenological point), there is never simply an "I think" but rather an "I think something" or, more precisely in the Kantian context, an "I think substance" and "I think causality." "The I brings them [the categories] in its foregoing

orienting-of-itself-towards ... to the point where they can unify as represented, ruling unities" (150/103).<sup>41</sup>

The next step in Heidegger's argument is fragmentary to a fault, but the basic import is clear. The process of turning toward something [having an experience at all] presupposes, as a constitutive condition, representing or holding up to oneself in an abiding and holistic, typically tacit manner, the unities supplied by the categories. The process of pure understanding, of holding up those categorical unities as rules, is spontaneous and *a priori*, relative to actual experience, pre-determining what counts as an object of experience. But if pure understanding is this spontaneous pre-forming of the unity in which something can be encountered, then it is fundamentally the work of the transcendental imagination.<sup>42</sup> Pure concepts of the understanding serve as rules only insofar as they are schematized. As Heidegger is quick to point out, Kant characterizes a transcendental schema as both a schema of the understanding (A 149f/B 179f) and a product of the imagination (A 142/B 181). The dual characterization is understandable, Heidegger adds, since the pure understanding, far from occasionally activating transcendental schemata, is what it is – representing categories as unities that enable empirical unities – only insofar as it “works with the schemata” produced by the imagination (A 140/B 179). Hence, Heidegger infers: “The accomplishment of the pure understanding, seemingly on its own, in the thinking of the unities is, as spontaneous formative representing, a pure, basic act of the transcendental imagination” (151/104).<sup>43</sup>

<sup>41</sup> Again, the realism informing Heidegger's interpretation is patent. Orienting oneself toward such and such brings the categories to the point “from where, as represented, regulating unities, they can unify” – but what is unified is otherwise already on hand (150/103), even self-sufficient (122/83).

<sup>42</sup> In other words, the rules must be held together in an anticipatory representation of an abiding sameness. Representation of that abiding sameness incorporates the “I think substance,” “I think unity,” and so on in a foregoing, unthematic orientation toward objects that allows them to stand opposite the subject accordingly. So interpreted, pure understanding is a spontaneous modeling or pre-forming (*Vorbilden*) of the unified horizon that enables cognition of objects (transcendence). But this spontaneous modeling is the transcendental schematism. Since the transcendental schematism is a product of the transcendental imagination, so is pure understanding.

<sup>43</sup> Based largely upon a phenomenological analysis of understanding and imagination, Heidegger rejects the objection that the understanding's spontaneity excludes the imagination's receptivity (*qua* sensory) and vice versa (153f/105).

#### 7. “OVERINTERPRETING”: CONCLUDING REMARKS

Insofar as the Transcendental Analytic sets out to explain transcendental conditions of the possibility of empirical knowledge, Heidegger's interpretation makes a powerful case that it succeeds – by Kant's own lights, at least in the *Critique's* first edition – only by according pure imagination a foundational role. The imagination is the source of every synthesis (II) and without the pure imagination's synthesis described in (III)–(V), neither pure intuition nor pure understanding can function as epistemic conditions at all. Yet Heidegger's aim is not simply to capture in other terms what Kant says, but to give the most plausible interpretation of what Kant is mightily trying to say or should say (201f/137f). Accordingly, when Heidegger claims (VI) that pure intuition and pure understanding are themselves rooted in pure imagination, he exercises a certain “violence,” as he puts it (XVII/xviii), moving beyond Kant's own self-imposed constraints and, in the process, exposing the fruitlessness of attempting to explain the possibility of knowledge through analysis of imagination (or other faculties, for that matter).

Heidegger reads the epistemology of the *Critique of Pure Reason* from a realist point of view, but it is a phenomenological realism rather than the critical realism popular in his day. The object, on this reading, is the thing in itself as it appears against a horizon [world] co-constituted by the subject's activity of turning toward entities on hand in a way that allows them to stand opposite it. Yet, whatever its plausibility as a reading of the *Critique* in other respects, this streamlined conception of objects omits a crucial dimension on which critical realist readings in particular insist. Far from being simply the appearance of something on hand within the subject's horizon, an object as such belongs to nature as an objective realm determined by synthetic *a priori* principles. Perhaps Heidegger's realization of his neglect of this dimension explains his admission that he is guilty in *KPM* of “overinterpreting” the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

In any case, this overinterpretation has exercised considerable hold on several philosophers on the European continent. Merleau-Ponty, Foucault, and Deleuze all have their differences with Heidegger, yet each of them invokes the interpretation that he gives of the Kantian to subject in *KPM*,<sup>44</sup> similarly, Derrida draws on this interpretation to defend Heidegger from Levinas's objections (as well as to advance his

<sup>44</sup> Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phénoménologie de la perception* (Paris: Gallimard, 1945), 482, 487; Jean-Pierre Faye, “Philosophie le plus ironique” in Yannick Beaubatie (ed.), *Tombeau de Gilles Deleuze* (Tulle: Mille sources, 2000), 91: “Des l'an 50 nous [Faye and Deleuze] évoquions ensemble le grand profond livre heideggerien de 1929, *Kant et le problème*

own objections to aspects of Heidegger's own thinking<sup>45</sup>; a critical commentary on *KPM* plays a crucial role in Jean-Luc Nancy's account of images and imagination.<sup>46</sup> Indeed, at least for this stripe of thinkers, *KPM* has become something of a canonical reading of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, perhaps explaining the relative dearth among them, as mentioned at the outset, of comparable studies of the *Critique*.<sup>47</sup>

*de la métaphysique*, alors non traduit, – et ses trois 'ek-stases' du temps"; Gilles Deleuze, *Différence et répétition* [Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1976], 260n1; Gilles Deleuze, *Foucault*, tr. Sean Hand [Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989], 107–119, 129f.

<sup>45</sup> Jacques Derrida, *L'écriture et la différence* [Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1967], 199, 206f; *Marges de la philosophie* [Paris: Les éditions de Minuit, 1972], 34, 49, 54.

<sup>46</sup> Jean-Luc Nancy, *The Ground of the Image*, tr. Jeff Fort [New York: Fordham University Press, 2005], 23f, 80–99.

<sup>47</sup> Perhaps a further reason contributing to this dearth among philosophers on the Continent is the fact that many (for example, Emmanuel Levinas, Paul Ricoeur) find more critical inspiration in the *Critique of Practical Reason* and others (for example, Jean-François Lyotard, Hannah Arendt, Gilles Deleuze) in the *Critique of the Power of Judgment* than in the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

## 17 Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* and Analytic Philosophy

### I. INTRODUCTION

This chapter considers three key works of analytic Kantianism: Clarence Irving Lewis, *Mind and the World Order* (1929); Sir Peter Strawson, *The Bounds of Sense* (1966); and Wilfrid Sellars, *Science and Metaphysics: Variations on Kantian Themes* (1968). We begin with some characteristics of early analytic philosophy that framed analytic philosophers' views of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*.<sup>1</sup>

Early Anglophone analytic philosophy came to focus on language. Ordinary language analysis contends that philosophical problems arise from decoupling terms or phrases from their ordinary contexts of use, in which alone they have definite use and meaning; it tends to a therapeutic approach to philosophy. What may be called "ideal language" analysis (broadly speaking) contends that philosophical problems arise through the use of the "material" mode of speech – that is, ordinary speech about persons, things, or events, to formulate philosophical problems; diagnosing and solving or dissolving these problems requires ascending to a constructed "formal" mode of speech, which restates those issues meta-linguistically as

This chapter is dedicated to the late Jay Rosenberg, with whom I dearly wished to have discussed these matters, at least once more.

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<sup>1</sup> Carnap's views are far more indebted to neo-Kantianism than to Kant. The other two philosophers most germane to the present topic are Moritz Schlick and Jay Rosenberg; see Bibliography, Articles cited in this volume. On McDowell's purported Kantianism, see Graham Bird, "McDowell's Kant: *Mind and World*," *Philosophy* 71.276 (1996), 219–43; and my "Contemporary Epistemology: Kant, Hegel, McDowell," *The European Journal of Philosophy* 14.2 (2006): 274–302; repr. in J. Lindgaard, ed., *John McDowell: Experience, Norm and Nature* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2008), 124–51.