

MILITARY OCCUPATION AND CRIMINAL GOVERNANCE IN RIO DE JANEIRO

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Abstract

In 2014, the Brazilian military occupied Complexo da Maré, a set of informal neighborhoods dominated by several drug trafficking gangs for the previous three decades. For 15 months, 2,500 Brazilian troops imposed a new form of order in Maré, subjecting residents to frequent searches and seizures, around-the-clock patrols, as well as "hearts and minds"-style counterinsurgency tactics. For their part, all three of Maré's gangs shifted their drug trafficking activities to adapt to this new security environment but remained militarized to different degrees. One gang remilitarized completely and directly confronted the military. Another gang demilitarized but maintained a significant presence within their territory while another gang remained demilitarized but was little present within their turf. This article offers a ground-level perspective of how counterinsurgency and peacekeeping doctrine have been adapted to Brazil's domestic efforts to combat drug trafficking gangs. It also argues that divergent gang responses to occupation were due to different imperatives for territorial control vis-à-vis rival gangs. This article draws on 18 months of ethnographic fieldwork and 175 semi-structured interviews with current and former gang members, local politicians, and favela residents.

Keywords

organized crime, criminal governance, drug trafficking, gangs, military intervention, counterinsurgency, ethnography, Rio de Janeiro

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Word Count: 10,602

Introduction

At dawn on the morning of April 5th, 2014, the Brazilian military invaded Complexo da Maré, a sprawling cluster of 16 favelas in the northern zone of Rio de Janeiro. The military's intervention came just two months before the start to the 2014 World Cup. It represented the culmination of Rio's heralded Police Pacification Units (UPPs), a public security program intended to recapture the state's monopoly of violence from drug trafficking gangs in hundreds of favelas throughout the city. According to Rio's public security apparatus, the military's occupation of Maré was intended to be short-term—just four months—to build local capacity before the installation of a UPP (Coelho, 2014). This would never come to pass. Instead, 2,500 marine and army soldiers occupied Maré for 15 months, during which time they conducted frequent searches and seizures, around-the-clock patrols, and fixed and mobile checkpoints combined with “hearts and minds”-style counterinsurgency tactics.

For their part, Maré's three drug trafficking gangs lost their territorial control and the ability to operate open-air drug markets. And yet, drawing from 18 months of ethnographic research in Maré, I find that each of Maré's three gang organizations reacted in divergent ways to military occupation. One gang remilitarized as large numbers of gang members quickly returned to the streets, openly carried high-powered weapons, and engaged in direct conflict with military personnel. Another gang demilitarized but maintained a significant though unarmed presence within their territory. The third gang, meanwhile, remained demilitarized and was little present within their turf. Why did Maré's gangs react so differently to the imposition of force by the Brazilian state?

I argue that these divergent gang responses were due to the varying levels of rival threat that each of the gangs faced. Despite military occupation and intensive operations, a rival managed to infiltrate one of the three gang's territories. Presented with the possibility of losing

control of their turf and death or expulsion from their territory, the gang was forced to remilitarize to defend their territory. On the other hand, Maré's other two gangs did not face such a rival threat and were able to remain demilitarized through the occupation. Thus they avoided any direct confrontation with the military. And yet, I also documented variation in strategies of demilitarization: one of the gangs maintained a strong though demilitarized presence in their territory due to a long history of inter-gang conflict while the other gang, which had no such history of conflict, maintained only a limited presence in their turf. These divergent trajectories speak to the strategic behaviors of these organizations and the importance of inter-gang rivalries to when and where criminal organizations engage in direct conflict with state security forces. Moreover, despite these different trajectories, on June 30th 2015, when the military finally left Maré, each of the gangs quickly reestablished territorial control and resumed their routine drug trafficking operations. Contrary to the stated goals of occupation, the military had failed to weaken the power and authority of these gang organizations. Ultimately, this article explores how each of Maré's gangs survived occupation but in very different ways.

The article is organized as follows: I begin by describing the increasingly common practice, observed across Latin America, of national military forces engaging in domestic policing operations and the implications of this trend for the study of political and criminal violence. I then outline the research design and methods employed during 18 months of ethnographic fieldwork in Maré. In the third section, I delve into the confluence of factors which led to the Brazilian military's occupation of Maré before describing the various governance practices, illicit activities, and forms of violence in which Maré's gangs engaged prior to occupation. Part five describes how the military occupied Maré and their implementation of a new form of order. I then detail the various operations and activities the military employed to combat gangs and gain the support of the local population using both personal observations as

well as interviews and meetings with residents, gang members and military personnel. Next, I analyze how each of Maré's gangs adapted to the challenges of occupation and why. I conclude by evaluating the possibilities and limitations of military interventions to combat criminal organizations and urban violence more generally.

Military Intervention and Criminal Violence in Latin America

The role of Latin America's militaries in domestic conflicts has evolved significantly over the last several decades. Many of the region's ethnically or ideologically-oriented insurgent groups or terrorist organizations have been replaced by an assortment of armed actors not motivated by or concerned with larger political transformation. Following Latin America's transition to electoral democracy in the 1980s, a plethora of drug trafficking organizations, cartels, militias, vigilante groups, smuggling networks, and prison and street gangs have spread across the region, engaging in world-leading levels of violence. A lack of faith in traditional public security institutions has led Latin American countries to increasingly call upon their armed forces to confront these groups (Pion-Berlin & Carreras, 2019).

Examples are not hard to come by. In Colombia, the military has engaged in decades of operations against insurgents and drug trafficking organizations, thus blurring the boundary between that country's counterinsurgency efforts and domestic policing. In 2006, the Mexican military was deployed to combat more than a dozen regionally-concentrated drug cartels (Shirk & Wallman, 2015). Such military involvement in domestic policing can also be observed in the various *Mano Dura* (Iron Fist) campaigns to confront street gangs in El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala (Wolf, 2017; Ávalos, 2019). These regional policies also mirror the USA's War on Drugs in which the American military has provided intelligence, training, and weaponry to local, state, and federal police (Alexander, 2010: 74–78). In recent months, South Africa has even

deployed military troops to combat gangs violence in impoverished townships surrounding Cape Town (de Greef, 2019). The involvement of the military in domestic policing is likely to only further expand in the future (Muggah & Sullivan, 2018).

Political violence research must recognize the increasing and renewed involvement of militaries in domestic policing. Much existing work in this area concerns the origins and evolution of military intervention from a regional or country-specific perspective (Hunter, 1996; Cruz, 2011; Kyle & Reiter, 2018; Müller, 2018). Others, meanwhile, have looked at the effects of particular military strategies, such as decapitation or kingpin removal (Guerrero-Gutiérrez, 2011; Calderon et al., 2015; Phillips, 2015; Pion-Berlin, 2017). While these works provide important insights, they have mostly taken a birds-eye view of this phenomenon with little empirical documentation of the on-the-ground military tactics and operations intended to combat criminal organizations and reduce violence, more generally. This article seeks to fill this gap by offering a micro-level analysis of an extended period of military operations in one set of neighborhoods.

This article also contributes to the substantial and growing literature concerning the behavior of non-state armed groups. Beginning in the early 2000s, the micro-comparative turn in the study of civil war revolutionized our understanding of non-state armed groups and their use of various forms of violence (Cohen, 2016; Kalyvas, 2006; Metelits, 2009; Weinstein, 2007), their dynamics of recruitment (Daly, 2016; Weinstein & Humphreys, 2008; Wood, 2003), how and why they engage in governance (Arjona, 2016, 2017), when and where they form alliances (Christia, 2012) as well as why some remain cohesive while others fragment (Staniland, 2012). Research in this area, however, has almost completely focused on armed groups in contexts in which the state and its institutions have either broken down or are under direct contestation—i.e. failed states, civil wars, insurgencies, or revolutions. By contrast, political violence scholars have

avoided studying non-state armed groups that operate within seemingly stable and “democratic” societies because these groups are not “political.” This difference has been overstated (Trejo & Ley, 2019; Kalyvas, 2015; Lessing, 2015; Barnes, 2017) and, as a result, the insights from the study of non-state armed groups have not yet been fully brought to bear on criminal organizations.

This article contributes to the expansion of the political violence research by applying the conceptual and theoretical tools developed to study non-state armed groups in conflict contexts to criminal groups in democratic settings. In this effort, it builds on the work of an emerging group of scholars focusing on the strategic behavior of these organizations and their members. For one, Lessing (2017) has argued that unconditional militarized crackdowns on criminal organizations incentivize these groups to confront the state in what he has termed cartel-state conflict. Simultaneously, he discounts the role of inter-criminal competition in why these groups respond violently to militarized policing operations (46–49). My findings demonstrate the opposite. I argue that inter-criminal competition is *the* precipitating factor leading to gang-military conflict in Maré. I find that only one of Maré’s gangs remilitarized and confronted the military following occupation. They did so not because they were motivated to combat the state and its agents but because they had to protect their turf against a rival gang intent on taking it from them. Although Lessing notes on this mechanism (78–79), he overlooks its importance because his theory applies mostly to organizations operating at a higher level of analysis (cartels or syndicates that span multiple cities or subnational regions). To understand the behavior of most criminal organizations, we must pay greater attention to micro-level territorial imperatives because this is the level at which the vast majority of these groups operate.

In this vein, the competition for territory between gang organizations shares much in common with the study of other types of non-state armed groups. In particular, Stathis Kalyvas’

(2006) seminal work on collective violence in civil war demonstrates how the distribution of territorial control between competing armed groups drives their use of violence. In a similar vein, Sarah Daly (2016) has argued that when and where armed groups remilitarize and engage in violence is also largely driven by local territorial control and balances of power especially as they relate to geographies of recruitment. While the armed groups investigated in this article differ in important respects from insurgents and paramilitaries, I also find that the distribution of territorial control and the geography of recruitment to play essential roles in gang militarization and violence. Overall, this article refines these existing theories by arguing that we must recognize the territorial imperatives of criminal organizations vis-à-vis other criminal groups to understand not only when and where violence escalates but how these groups respond to targeted and militarized policing operations.

A significant body of work has focused on these competitive dynamics though they have analyzed this behavior at higher levels of analysis. First, Durán-Martinez (2018) argues that huge spikes in violence across five Colombian and Mexican cities following militarized interventions were the result of violent confrontations between neighborhood-level gangs, armed and enabled by competing cartels. To test her theory, she uses violence statistics aggregated to the city-level. Cities are often comprised of dozens if not hundreds of gangs. Dynamics of violence are often unevenly distributed across them. We must focus on these territories—city blocks, neighborhoods, or informal communities—to understand the causal mechanisms leading to violence. Similarly, Guillermo Trejo and Sandra Ley (2016, 2018, 2019) have used municipal and state-level statistics of inter-cartel violence to demonstrate how party affiliations and turnover impact violence throughout these territories. While these works have made important contributions to understanding the structural factors leading to subnational variation in criminal violence, we continue to lack micro-level data to delineate the causal mechanisms leading *some*

criminal groups but not others to engage in violence. Such a research agenda requires a very different methodological approach.

Research Design and Methodology

This article employs a comparative ethnographic research design. By ethnography, I refer not just to interviews and long-term fieldwork but to the use of participant observation and ‘immersion in the place and lives of people under study’ (Wedeen, 2010: 257). For the most part, ethnographers have focused on single case studies to highlight complexity and contextual meaning while ignoring case comparisons and explicitly refuting claims of generalizability. In a recent innovation, however, Simmons and Rush Smith have argued that ethnographers can better engage with broader theoretical debates in comparative politics by conducting ‘ethnographic research that explicitly and intentionally builds an argument through the analysis of two or more cases’ (Simmons & Smith, 2019: 341). This article takes just such an approach by comparing the dynamics of military occupation across three separate gang territories with an eye toward understanding the behaviors and rationales of gang organizations and the dynamics of military intervention more broadly.

Such an ethnographic approach to the study of military intervention and criminal violence departs significantly from much of the existing research in these areas. At least within political science, scholars have analyzed and evaluated public security interventions and initiatives most often through the use of public security statistics, journalistic accounts, and by conducting elite-level interviews with security officials, bureaucrats, or even the politicians responsible for these policies and practices. These methodological approaches are insufficient to understand the real impact of these interventions. For one, the perspectives of state security officials are heavily biased. They often elide state agents’ abusive or violent activities while blaming local actors for

any such incidents. Moreover, statistics regarding violence and crime are heavily skewed because individuals living in communities where criminal organizations operate are often afraid of reporting violence for fear of retribution by these groups. They are simultaneously subject to the most repressive forms of policing and seldom trust state representatives enough to report abuses or violence. Thus, the lack of ethnographic knowledge concerning the people and places where military interventions occur represents a significant blind spot for this research agenda while also bringing into doubt existing theoretical claims and policy prescriptions.

This article draws on three years of fieldwork in Rio de Janeiro and eighteen months of ethnographic research in Complexo da Maré, a group of 16 favelas in Rio de Janeiro's northern zone, with an estimated population of 140,000. I moved to Maré in June of 2013, nine months before the arrival of the military, and concluded participant observation activities in November of 2014, nine months into military occupation. I returned for several months in 2015 and 2017 each. During fieldwork, I spent 24 hours a day, seven days a week in my field site. To the extent that a 6'2" gringo could, I lived my life like any other favela resident. I shopped at local supermarkets, ate at Maré's restaurants, and attended numerous music performances, sporting events, and other cultural events. I became intimately familiar with each of Maré's sixteen neighborhoods by walking or biking through the labyrinth of streets and alleyways. Prior to military occupation, I attended dozens of gang-organized dances, birthday parties, and holiday celebrations while subjecting myself to gang control and authority. During the period of military occupation, I attended dozens of military-organized events and was subject to hundreds of military operations. Over the course of eighteen months, I witnessed thousands of interactions between gang members, residents, and military soldiers. Such an immersive and participatory methodology allowed me to better understand and document how military personnel behaved as well as the occupation's impact on Maré's gangs.

Given Maré's enormous population and extensive territories, a comprehensive accounting of the process of occupation through participant observation alone was not possible. Therefore, I also collected several other forms of data. I conducted 175 semi-structured interviews with residents of all ages and backgrounds, 75 of which were with current and former members of all three of Maré's gangs, and another 100 with NGO workers, local politicians, and long-time residents from each of the gang territories.¹ I also engaged in hundreds of less formal conversations and thousands of daily encounters and interactions that also inform the analysis presented here. In addition, I accompanied several local NGOs, all sixteen of Maré's *Residents Associations*, and several other religious and civil society organizations while also attending dozens of public security meetings in the lead up to and during military occupation. Finally, I supplement all of these personal observations and interviews with newspaper accounts and local NGO reports.

The Brazilian Military in Policing Rio de Janeiro

Following more than two decades of military dictatorship (1964-1985), Brazil's 1988 constitution officially returned the Armed Forces to civilian authority. At the same time, article 142 of the constitution, referred to as the Guarantee of Law and Order (GLO), offered a path for the military to intervene in domestic affairs but only at the request of the President. In subsequent years, a series of laws refined the GLO framework to apply only when the Military Police are 'unavailable, inexistent or insufficient to the regular performance of their constitutional mission' (Samset, 2014: 6).² Despite this rather vague criteria, the GLO clause has been invoked more than a dozen times over the years. In addition to providing security for mega-

¹ All names are pseudonyms and have been changed for security considerations.

² Brazil's Military Police, tasked with ostensive policing duties, and Civil Police, tasked with investigatory duties, operate under the authority of each of Brazil's 27 state governors.

events, elections, visits by foreign dignitaries, and workers' strikes, several GLO operations have targeted what were initially referred to as 'opponent forces' but later revised to 'public order disturbance agents' (8). In every case so far, this has meant drug trafficking gangs.

With the inauguration of Rio's Police Pacification Units (UPPs) in the late 2000s, the role of the military in domestic policing operations expanded even further. The Pacification methodology to reasserting the sovereignty of the state in hundreds of gang-controlled favelas included four stages, the first two of which involved military cooperation. In the first "tactical intervention" stage, elite police units (BOPE) conducted massive assaults on gang-held favelas, which often involved the use of military tanks, helicopters, and personnel. During the "stabilization" stage, military soldiers and police occupied the community and conducted weeks or, in some cases, months of sweeps and operations to find any remaining drugs, weapons, and gang members. The third and fourth stages of Pacification included the installation of new proximity policing units (UPPs) as well as local development and infrastructure projects but did not involve significant military involvement.

Between 2008 and 2014, the city installed 38 separate UPPs impacting more than 250 gang-controlled favelas and 1 million of Rio's citizens.³ The Pacification methodology to reassert the sovereignty of the Brazilian state in these neighborhoods included the intimate involvement of the military. Tanks, helicopters, and personnel assisted in the initial invasions with military soldiers frequently conducting weeks or, in some cases, months of sweeps and patrols to find any remaining drugs, weapons, and gang members. Beginning in late 2010, 800 marine and army soldiers occupied Complexo do Alemão, a group of a dozen contiguous favelas in the northern zone of the city, for 18 months (Harig, 2015: 151). Alemão's occupation was, by most accounts, considered a success. Both gang and police violence decreased precipitously,

³ The Pacification program and methodology did not officially exist until 2011 but earlier favela takeovers were later integrated into the program.

drug trafficking became clandestine, and many residents preferred the presence of the military to that of the police (Savell, 2014). Its success set the stage for Maré's occupation several years later.

Maré's occupation cannot be fully understood without also delving into the evolution of the Brazilian military. In 2004, then-President Luiz Ignacio Lula da Silva, seeking to expand Brazil's political influence internationally, sent a force of several thousand troops to lead the new United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). Many of the troops stationed in Haiti would later be involved in Rio's Pacification program and, eventually, in the occupations of Alemão and Maré. In addition, the military's strategies to combat Haiti's gangs borrowed from and refined tactics the military had employed in previous GLO operations (Soliani & Scolese, 2004; Hoelscher & Norheim-Martinsen, 2014; Harig, 2015). These tactics had also been developed from an emerging set of methodologies in counterinsurgency contexts—from Iraq and Afghanistan as well as other UN 'stabilisation' missions—in which militaries combine the use of force to impose order with development and infrastructure projects to alleviate poverty (Muggah, 2014; Siman & Santos, 2018). Through a close examination of the on-the-ground operations and behaviors of the Brazilian military in one set of favelas over an extended period of time, this article goes some way in evaluating the possibilities and limitations of these strategies for effectively combating criminal groups and urban violence.

Gang Control and Governance prior to Military Occupation

To fully understand the impact of Maré's occupation, we must first delve into the nature of gang control and governance which preceded the arrival of the military. Maré's gangs first emerged in the 1960s and 1970s as loosely organized groups of young men that engaged in armed robberies and/or the sale of marijuana. By the early 1990s, however, several of these local

gangs had become fully integrated into two separate prison-based factions, Comando Vermelho and Terceiro Comando, which had emerged during Brazil's dictatorship (Amorim 1993; Arias 2006). With these faction affiliations, Maré's gangs gained access to Andean cocaine and more powerful weaponry.⁴ They also began to more violently compete with one another for control of the local drug trade. Over the next two decades, inter-gang violence was a near-constant in Maré with significant territorial turnover. After 2009, however, gang territories stabilized and, despite some ongoing violence, three drug-trafficking gangs as well as a *milícia* maintained consolidated control of territories within Maré.⁵ In the several years and months leading up to military occupation, the majority of the inter-gang violence occurring in Maré was reserved to the border area between the CV2 and TCP gangs as they continued to compete for local dominance.



Figure 1. Map of gang territorial control in Complexo da Maré

⁴ A third gang faction, Amigos dos Amigos, would emerge in the 1990s as a result of a schism within Comando Vermelho.

⁵ Comprised of retired or off-duty public security personnel, *milícias* began to compete for control of dozens of favelas across the city in the early 2000s. These organizations are seldom involved in drug trafficking directly but often run protection rackets and monopolize certain illicit or informal markets within these neighborhoods. Although research was also conducted in this area of Maré, gaining access to *milícia* members was not possible for security reasons. Therefore, I have left the analysis of the impact of occupation on this area of Maré out of this article.

Violence in Maré, however, was not just the result of inter-gang competition preceding occupation. In the months leading up to occupation, military-style police operations became frequent, at least once a week according to my fieldnotes. These operations usually involved highly-trained police units from the Special Police Operations Battalion (BOPE). Maré's gangs generally avoided direct confrontations with the better-armed and trained BOPE, instead preferring to hide and wait in the homes and businesses of residents and family members before returning to the streets when the operations had concluded. BOPE operations always included the use of militarized vehicles and helicopters and, despite their frequency, only rarely did they result in outright violence between the gangs and police (for further discussion of such operations, see Larkins, 2013). This is due to the fact that gangs generally avoid direct confrontations with the better-armed and trained police. Instead, they prefer to hide and wait in the homes and businesses of residents and family members before returning to the streets when the operations had concluded.

Each of Maré's gangs maintained a significant coercive presence within their territories prior to occupation. On any given day, numerous gang members could be observed ostentatiously displaying their semi-automatic weapons on the streets of their turf. Each gang also had numerous *olheiros* (lookouts) and *fogueteiros* (firecrackers) located at all of the entry and exit points to watch for police invasions and rival gangs. In addition, the gangs sold drugs at *bocas de fumo* (mouths of smoke), small plastic tables with plastic bags filled with different quantities of marijuana, cocaine, and crack. One or two gang members called *vapores* (vapors) were responsible for the exchange of money and drugs while *gerentes* (managers)—with the help of *embaladores* (packers)—cut the drugs into different quantities, packaged them, and then collected the money that was then passed onto the *Dono* (the gang leader). Several heavily-armed *soldados* (soldiers) were always located around the *bocas*, providing security and

protecting the gang's investments. Prior to occupation, most of Maré's nearly three dozen *bocas* operated 24 hours a day. Importantly, all of these *bocas* were stationary and several had been located in the same place for more than two decades. The gangs also sold significant quantities of drugs at massive street parties, called *baile funks*, held on weekend nights in each of the gang territories and attended by thousands of local youth.

Each of Maré's gangs also implemented an informal though highly effective form of social order. Gang members were often involved in the arbitration of disputes between residents. They prohibited interpersonal violence, fights between residents, theft and robbery within the community, and domestic or sexual violence. Gang punishments for transgressions of these rules often included threats, beatings, expulsion, or even death depending on the severity of the infraction and the specific persons involved. While gang social order was unevenly applied throughout these communities (see Arias & Rodrigues, 2006), their dispute resolution and informal system of justice were essential services for populations that had no recourse to state provided forms—both because the gangs prohibited residents from speaking with police and residents lacked faith in Rio's police. During my time in Maré, I never heard of a resident going to the police to deal with any dispute, crime, or other incident. According to a large sample survey of Maré's residents conducted by a local NGO, less than 4% of the population had ever reported an incident to the police (Silva 2017).

While much of gang control and authority is derived from their use and threat of violence, gang-resident relations were complex and multi-faceted. First, gang members maintained significant familial and associational networks within these communities. Most of Maré's gang members were born and raised in these neighborhoods and many of the older gang members maintained several girlfriends with whom they had multiple children. The gangs also offered numerous residents access to informal and illicit markets. Residents received permission

from the gangs to put up small roadside stands and stalls where they sold fruits and vegetables, perishable goods, housewares, clothing, or electronics. The gangs also allowed residents to sell food and drink at their weekly *baile funks* which represented a significant source of income for many families.

The gangs also maintained positive and beneficial relations with residents by engaging in some limited forms of welfare and community building. The poorest members of Maré often received a *cesta básica* (monthly food basket) from gang affiliates which could feed a small family for a month. Gang members also distributed small sums of money, gas cannisters for cooking, or other forms of economic assistance to residents that might ask them for help. Several times a year, the gangs also threw holiday parties (most often for Mother's, Father's, and Children's Day), where they offered free food and drink to attendees while handing out toys and candy to children or, more recently, raffling off prizes such as bicycles, electronics, and household appliances. Prominent gang members also threw birthday parties for their family members to which they invited dozens if not hundreds of guests, providing free food and drink, and distributing presents to invitees.

Military Occupation: A New Form of Order

On March 28th, 2014, Dilma Rousseff signed the GLO for the Brazilian Armed Forces to take full authority over Complexo da Maré (Gomes, 2014). After an initial invasion by public security personnel, at dawn on April 5th, 2014, the military invaded. Within an hour, dozens of tanks, trucks, jeeps, and other militarized vehicles, as well as hundreds of soldiers on foot occupied the streets of Maré. The military quickly imposed a new and very different form of order. Roughly a third of the 2,500 army and marine soldiers stationed in Maré were on-duty at

any given time.⁶ Of these, 400-500 soldiers were always on the streets. Most were assigned to mobile patrol units in which soldiers monitored the main thoroughfares of each of the gang territories from the backs of jeeps and flatbed trucks. During the day, these mobile units also conducted on-foot patrols in many of the narrow streets and alleyways through which the larger vehicles could not pass. At night, they mostly stayed on the main streets and the trucks and jeeps were replaced by tanks.

The remaining on-duty soldiers manned 24-hour checkpoints around Maré, which were strategically placed to monitor entry and exit points as well as the internal borders between the gangs. At checkpoints, soldiers stopped and searched cars, motorcycles, and persons for weapons and drugs. The nature of these searches were highly targeted and racialized. Darker skinned adolescents and young men were disproportionately stopped and searched, a strategy the military assured residents was necessary because these young men were the most likely to be ‘public order disturbance agents.’⁷ Some of my interlocutors were searched dozens if not hundreds of times during occupation. While many of these encounters were not antagonistic, the searches were a daily source of frustration for the young men.⁸ Even though I passed through their checkpoints nearly every day for nine months, the military only stopped and searched me twice.

In addition to the imposition of force, the military implemented a series of measures to gather intelligence. Building on similar tactics used by the American military in Iraq and Afghanistan, they organized a company of roughly 140 soldiers to gather intelligence about Maré’s gangs (Ghali, 2017). The military created a hotline called *Disque Pacificação*, the number for which was emblazoned on the sides of every military vehicle. Residents were

⁶ Each contingent of 2,500 troops was rotated out of service every two to three months to avoid the possible corruption of soldiers that became more likely with extended deployments. 23,500 troops eventually took part in Maré’s occupation (Bacelar, 2015).

⁷ Maré que Queremos meeting 7/3/2014.

⁸ Fulton 7/3/2014; Breno 7/15/2014.

encouraged to call in to report gang activities and other crimes.⁹ According to military officials, the hotline received 1,495 calls in the first six months of occupation though the number of denunciations diminished significantly after the first few months (Valdevino & Antunes, 2014).¹⁰

The military also implemented what can be termed a “hearts and minds” approach to local governance. They held dozens of public and private meetings with local NGOs, representatives of Residents’ Associations, as well as state service providers. The military also engaged with some of Maré’s numerous Evangelical churches by organizing *cultos* (worship services) for the soldiers at local congregations.¹¹ They also organized a series of *ações sociais* (‘social actions’) including maternal health, painting, and music classes, *Luta Livre* (Jiu-jitsu) training sessions at local gyms, presentations at local schools, and some sparsely attended cultural events.¹² Finally, the military organized an event where they offered formal identification to residents, many of whom lacked the requisite documentation to legally work and receive government benefits and welfare.¹³

To say that military occupation transformed life in Maré is an understatement. Many of Maré’s residents’ lives improved dramatically as they and their families were no longer subject to the security and health concerns that corresponded to gang territorial control and the drug trade. Violent confrontations and shootouts between the TCP and CV2 gangs ended immediately. Areas of these communities which had once been a no man’s land, especially in and around the border between these rival gangs suddenly came back to life. Shops and stores appeared where none had existed before. Gone also were the numerous *bocas de fumo*, the *baile funk* parties, and the hundreds of well-armed gang members hanging out on street corners and riding their stolen

⁹ Alessandra 6/27/2014; Maré que Queremos meeting 7/3/2014.

¹⁰ Pacification meeting 9/5/2014.

¹¹ Patrício 6/28/2014.

¹² Pacification meeting 9/5/2014.

¹³ Vitor 8/22/2015.

motorcycles up and down the streets. Moreover, the frequent and often violent BOPE operations which characterized the months leading up to occupation also came to an end. As a result, residents commented on the greater calm and reduced noise that came along with military occupation.¹⁴

The benefits of military occupation, however, were not felt evenly across Maré's population. As referenced above, the freedom and movement of darker-skinned young men and adolescents, in particular, was curtailed. The military also made the bureaucratic process for organizing events so difficult that forms of recreation and entertainment common in most favelas diminished significantly.¹⁵ As a result, many youth as well as an assortment of other residents spoke nostalgically of gang control. 'There was a lot more freedom before. There were a lot of motos and a lot of parties. I miss it,' one young mother said to me.¹⁶ Other Maré residents lost access to forms of economic assistance and governance upon which they had previously relied. A variety of informal economies vanished. Some streets which had once been lined with shacks and carts selling all manner of food and household item, were no longer allowed. The money that hundreds of families had made at the weekly *baile funks* was also gone. In addition, the military imposed a more regularized building code under which many residents bristled. The military even bulldozed several dozen informal huts and shacks (family homes), that had been built on the margins of Maré or in areas of new development.¹⁷

While the military presence did perhaps provide a more regular form of order, when it came to resolving interpersonal disputes and lower-level crimes, they were far less effective than the gangs. As has been reported in other "Pacified" favelas, incidences of theft, domestic and

¹⁴ Maré que Queremos meeting 7/3/2014.

¹⁵ Eventually, some *baile funks* were allowed though these street parties were very small as compared to these parties organized by the gangs. Special Denunciations meeting 11/5/2014.

¹⁶ Luiza 10/2/2014.

¹⁷ Breno 7/22/2014.

sexual violence, and interpersonal violence increased (Cano, 2012; Savell, 2014). Gang members reported that a lot of boys and adolescents were using the opportunity of occupation to steal and break laws because they thought that the gang wasn't there anymore.¹⁸ According to one former gang member, during the first couple months of occupation, residents had sought him out to deal with several cases of robbery and rape.¹⁹ NGO workers and a variety of residents also noted on the increase in theft and petty crimes.²⁰ A local Pastor said that he had received several complaints about sexual violence which was something he was not accustomed to dealing with.²¹

Gang Adaptation and Variation

In the days and weeks leading up the arrival of the military, BOPE and an assortment of other policing units conducted around-the-clock operations during which hundreds of Maré's full-time gang members were arrested and over a dozen killed (Platinow, 2014). By the time the military arrived, most of the senior members had chosen to flee and find refuge in other faction-affiliated favelas in the rest of the city.²² As a result, quickly after occupation, all but the youngest gang members (12-14 year-olds) were visibly absent from Maré's communities. Each of the gangs, however, quickly adapted to this new reality.

They were forced to shift their drug-selling techniques. Instead of stationary *bocas de fumo* located near all of the entrances and on all of the major thoroughfares, the retail drug trade moved deeper within Maré and became mobile. Within days of occupation, young gang members began to carry backpacks and place themselves in the alleyways along the major streets. At first they did so cautiously but as occupation progressed they would eventually shout

¹⁸ Severino 5/15/2014.

¹⁹ Severino 6/11/2014.

²⁰ Marcos 11/3/2014; Sergio 12/17/2014; Naldo 12/17/2014.

²¹ Patrício 6/27/2014.

²² The TCP gang leader was even arrested by Federal Police in a luxury apartment in the Western Zone of the city a couple of weeks prior to occupation (Vídeo da PF mostra Menor P sendo preso em apartamento no Rio, 2014).

out their product from the alleyways: ‘craque, maconha, pô!’ (Crack, marijuana, and powder!). These young men often worked in groups. One carried a backpack with the drugs while a couple of others served as lookouts, watching for any sign of military patrols on the surrounding streets. If and when a military patrol passed by, the boys would quickly duck into a side street or turn down one of the many alleys which crisscross Maré’s neighborhoods. The mobile *bocas* became a permanent aspect of the occupation period in each gang territory allowing the gangs to maintain some revenue from the drug trade.²³ Nonetheless, the loss of open-air drug markets and *baile funk* parties cost the gangs significantly. According to members of the CV2 gang, drug revenues decreased by roughly 75% from between R\$800,000 to R\$1,200,000 each month to just a few hundred thousand.²⁴

While all three of Maré’s drug trafficking gangs implemented the mobile *boca* strategy of retail drug sales, it quickly became apparent that the dynamics of occupation were very different in each of the gang territories. As occupation progressed, I increasingly observed how the gangs were shifting their structures and activities according to local circumstances. In turn, the military responded to these gang strategies by adapting their methods and tactics. In the following sections, I describe each of these contexts.

Terceiro Comando Puro

Within a couple of weeks of Maré’s occupation, the TCP gang had remilitarized. Visiting these neighborhoods each day, I noticed multiple older gang members were openly carrying pistols or had them tucked into their shorts. While not as ostentatious as before occupation, their armed presence was noticeable. It was also quickly apparent that TCP members were taking a

²³ Artur 1/11/2017; Bernardo 1/16/2017; Severino 5/15/2014; Fulton 7/3/2014.

²⁴ Inacio 3/26/2014; Marcio 4/17/2014; Everton 4/17/2014.

more antagonistic approach to military occupation. In a series of interviews and public meetings, residents and military officials alike described the more volatile circumstances in this gang's territories.²⁵ Why did the TCP gang choose to remilitarize?

I argue that the primary reason why TCP rearmed themselves was due to the possibility of permanently losing control of their territory to a rival gang. Prior to military occupation, TCP's primary security concern was their CV2 rival as these two gangs had engaged in decades of violent confrontations and invasion attempts. During occupation, however, a different threat to the TCP gang's territorial control emerged from a gang connected to the Amigos dos Amigos faction, located in an adjacent set of favelas (Caju). Several members of this gang, including its leader, were born and raised in Maré and were formerly part of an ADA gang which had lost its territory to TCP in a series of violent gun battles in 2009 (see figure 2 below). The surviving members of this gang had found refuge with their ADA allies in Caju. With military occupation and the inability of the TCP gang to monitor entry and exit to their territory, ADA members began to surreptitiously infiltrate their previous turf with the goal of retaking the area. Quickly thereafter, TCP and ADA members began to engage in sporadic confrontations.

The details of these inter-gang dynamics became known to me through my involvement with an NGO program designed to help gang members leave the gang life. Nearly 30 TCP members would eventually enroll in the program. In a series of interviews with these men, they described these gang histories and their frustration with occupation because the military was either unwilling or incapable of preventing ADA members from making incursions into their territory. They described how they and their families would be expelled from Maré if ADA managed to take back their territory.²⁶ One former member described how ADA members had

²⁵ Maré que Queremos meeting 4/29/2014; Meeting with General Roberto Escoto 5/13/2014. See also Silva (2017, 79).

²⁶ Ruan 7/15/2014; Rodrigo 7/15/2014; Daniel 8/21/2014.

even gone to his house and threatened his wife and children.²⁷ Many of these men felt their situations becoming increasingly untenable and, as a result, began to rethink their involvement with the program. The coordinators of the project also described how they were having a difficult time keeping the men involved in the program.²⁸ By the end of occupation, nearly half of the TCP members had dropped out of the program and rejoined the gang.



Figure 2. Map of gang territorial control in Complexo da Maré pre-2009

As the occupation progressed, conflict in the TCP territory intensified. ADA gang members continued to make a series of incursions into the area (Constancio, 2014; Heringer, 2014). My time spent in these neighborhoods became restricted to the mornings and early afternoons as confrontations between the rival gangs and soldiers became a nightly occurrence. Riding my bike through these areas during the day, I observed numerous gang members carrying semi-automatic weapons. When military patrols came near, the gang members would quickly

²⁷ Josué 7/15/2014.

²⁸ Valdemir 12/1/2014.

move indoors, wait for the vehicles to pass before reemerging to monitor the streets. Shootouts between ADA and TCP members and with military personnel became commonplace. Residents of the TCP area described how they had stopped counting the number of shootouts.²⁹ Local schools that served more than 7,000 students were frequently closed (Costa, 2014). In a particularly grisly episode at the height of these confrontations, the president of a local Residents' Association, Osmar Paiva Camelo, was shot seven times and killed (Allemand, 2014). Although the culprit was never found, according to multiple sources, the link between TCP's increasingly tenuous security position and the president's vocal support of the occupation precipitated his assassination.³⁰

After a number of soldiers were injured and one sergeant was killed in an encounter with TCP gang members, the military ramped up their coercive presence even further (O Globo, 2014; G1, 2015). They installed bunkers throughout the area and mounted several massive invasions involving hundreds of soldiers and dozens of tanks and trucks in which they went from house to house searching for TCP gang members (Costa, 2014).³¹ In public meetings, numerous residents described dozens of violations and abuses that occurred during operations.³² They recounted how the military broke down doors, entered homes without permission, used the rooftops of apartment buildings and schools to monitor the surrounding streets, and even shot and killed several residents with no known gang involvement (Valdevino & Antunes, 2014).³³ Survey results confirm these qualitative findings with residents of the TCP area reporting twice as many violations by military soldiers and twice the number of bad or terrible evaluations of military behavior (Silva 2017, 75–79). The military would stay in TCP's territory until June 30th, 2015,

²⁹ Olívia 9/26/2014. Special denunciations meeting 11/5/2014.

³⁰ Mateo 1/13/2015; Ademir 12/4/2014; Valdemir 12/1/2014; Bruno 10/6/2014.

³¹ Special denunciations meeting 11/5/2014.

³² Special denunciations meeting 11/5/2014.

³³ Special denunciations meeting 11/5/2014.

two months after soldiers had left both of the CV territories. Violent confrontations between TCP gang members and military soldiers would occur until the very end of occupation (Bom dia Brasil, 2015; Bacelar, 2015).

Comando Vermelho 2

The military occupation in the CV2 territory involved a very different set of dynamics. Although the military could not prevent ADA from infiltrating TCP's territory, the same was not true of the border between the CV2 and TCP gangs. In large part, this was due to the fact that the military had strategically placed multiple checkpoints and military vehicles along the border between these two gangs to prevent the possibility of inter-gang violence. Moreover, unlike the ADA gang members which had infiltrated the TCP territory surreptitiously, neither CV2 nor TCP members had such intimate knowledge and connections to their rivals' territory. As a result, the CV2 gang had little fear of invasion or confrontations with their longtime rival and would largely remain demilitarized for the duration of the occupation.

Like TCP, nearly 20 CV2 members joined the NGO program referenced above. Unlike the TCP group, however, the CV2 members did not have the same issue of recidivism.³⁴ The CV2 gang members that I interviewed did not describe the same difficulty with the occupation like their TCP counterparts. In fact, several of them believed the period to be an improvement over the previous era of gang control. First, they believed the military to be less brutal and aggressive than Rio's military police.³⁵ Given BOPE's focus on CV-affiliated gangs in the lead up to occupation and their famously aggressive and violent tactics, this is unsurprising. In addition, CV2 members suggested that the need to defend their territory against rivals caused a

³⁴ Manoel 9/15/2014; Valdemir 12/1/2014.

³⁵ Severino 5/15/2014. Lino 3/26/2014.

lot of problems and that the drug trade without the need for territorial control might be better for everyone in the long-run.³⁶ One former senior member even hoped that the drug trade would become more like the United States where dealers arrive to your house and there's no need for violence.³⁷

While CV2 did not remilitarize, most of CV2's senior members, even its leader, would eventually return to the area before the occupation ended. In July and August, I began to observe some of the senior gang members on the streets of the CV2 area. They had returned to the community but were unarmed and unaccompanied by the large security details which had surrounded them prior to occupation. They maintained low profiles, seldom leaving their apartments and homes, and only traveling in the communities at night. While CV2 did not remilitarize, its members did engage in many of the governance activities which were common before occupation. In fact, a close confidant of the gang leader said he had returned to resolve a variety of problems, such as fights or conflicts between residents and within the organization as well.³⁸ Several of the CV2 gang members agreed that it was important for the *Dono* to not be seen as absent and to maintain good relations with the community, especially for when occupation ended.³⁹ When I asked if there was something different about the governance that the gang offered during occupation, members only said that it was less intensive and that they lacked the *poder bélico* ('bellic power') to back up their decisions.⁴⁰

Although there was no inter-gang violence and CV2 members remained demilitarized, increasing conflicts between residents and the military began to disturb public order. For one, the military, responding to the increasing violence within the TCP area, began to engage in more

³⁶ Bruno 10/27/2014. Severino 5/15/2014.

³⁷ Inacio 3/26/2014.

³⁸ Inacio 3/26/2014.

³⁹ Inacio 3/26/2014; Severino 5/15/2014; Bruno 10/27/2014.

⁴⁰ Severino 6/11/2014.

aggressive policing practices throughout the entirety of Maré. In addition to the frequent stopping and searching of youth, patrols became more offensive. I witnessed an increasing number of operations in the CV2 area involving tanks, armored vehicles, and large numbers of soldiers. Troops began to use rubber bullets and tear gas more frequently and, in several circumstances, employed live ammunition.⁴¹ Moreover, because the CV2 gang remained demilitarized, large groups of young non-gang affiliated boys and adolescents asserted their own control over space. They harassed and provoked soldiers by throwing rocks and bottles from the rooftops onto the military patrols on the streets below.⁴² Large groups of adolescents also congregated on the main streets late at night, shouting obscenities, and throwing rocks and bottles at soldiers.⁴³ According to all of the gang members I interviewed, these boys and adolescents were not gang members but wannabees and hangers-on. When the military finally left the CV2 area on May 1 of 2015, these groups of young boys and adolescents were quickly disbanded as the CV2 gang immediately reasserted its full control over the area.

Comando Vermelho 1

Like Maré's other two gangs, only the youngest CV1 members were visible on the streets immediately following the military's occupation. That said, the CV1 territory was quite distinct from either of the other two gang territories. For one, this area of Maré had never experienced any inter-gang violence like the CV2 or TCP territories. According to interviews with CV1 gang members and residents, no one could remember any invasion attempts or shootouts between gang members in their lifetime.⁴⁴ This was mostly due to the fact that CV2's territory offered the

⁴¹ Breno 7/22/2014; Fight for Peace seminar 9/30/2014.

⁴² Breno 7/22/2014.

⁴³ Felicia 7/1/2014.

⁴⁴ Vinicius 11/9/2014; Evaristo 12/23/2014; Gustavo 11/19/2014.

CV1 gang a buffer from the most proximate rival gang. Owing to these low levels of inter-gang violence, police operations and violence had also been infrequent until a couple of years before occupation when BOPE moved their headquarters to an abandoned military base adjacent to the CV1 territory. Since then, BOPE had conducted frequent operations against both CV gangs in Maré. Nonetheless, residents and gang members of the CV1 territory continued to refer to it as the “*Zona Sul*” of Maré.⁴⁵ This more stable security environment helped contribute to a more stable and pacific occupation period.

Nonetheless, residents and gang members of the CV1 territory continued to refer to it as the “*Zona Sul*” of Maré.⁴⁶ Partially due to the lack of violence and local investments in the community, this area has numerous shops and restaurants that attract not just residents of Maré but many people from other parts of the city. Although the community still lacks infrastructure, sanitation, and other public services, it is much less impoverished than some of the other areas of Maré where abject poverty and insecure housing formations are more numerous. These better economic circumstances and the lack of inter-gang violence also helped contribute to a more stable and pacific occupation period.

For the duration of the occupation period, the CV1 gang remained demilitarized. I never observed pistols or rifles on the streets of these neighborhoods and aside from several mobile bocas, gang members did not return to this neighborhood in large numbers like the other two gang territories. One of the primary reasons was that the threat of rival invasions and takeovers were extremely unlikely. Therefore, CV1 members felt little need to return to the community during this period. In fact, unlike for the other two gangs, I had a difficult time finding CV1 gang members to interview during occupation despite maintaining significant contacts in this area of

⁴⁵ The *Zona Sul* of Rio de Janeiro is comprised of the wealthiest neighborhoods in and around the city’s iconic beaches.

⁴⁶ The *Zona Sul* of Rio de Janeiro is comprised of the wealthiest neighborhoods in and around the city’s iconic beaches.

Maré. Moreover, the antagonisms and confrontations between the military and local youth were neither observed personally nor described in interviews with residents in the area.

Finally, while both the CV2 and TCP gangs had a large number of members join the NGO program to leave gang life, the CV1 gang did not have a single member enroll in the program. Why? I noticed that many of the TCP and CV2 gang members that enrolled in the program were older—most were in their mid-to-late twenties—and had suffered beatings or shootings at the hands of other gangs as well as police. Several gang members described seeing friends and fellow gang members die over the years.⁴⁷ On the other hand, due to the lack of inter-gang violence and, for the most part, police violence, CV1 members had a more stable and secure environment during their tenure in the gang. This helps explain why no CV1 gang members enrolled in the program. Although the CV1 gang was little present in their territory for the duration of occupation, when the military tanks left the territory for good in May of 2015, CV1 gang members quickly returned, reasserted their territorial control, and resumed the open-air drug trade.

Conclusion

By the time the last of the troops left Maré on June 30th, 2015, the Brazilian military had conducted an estimated 83,000 operations, arrested 674 individuals, and apprehended 255 minors involved in the drug trade (G1, 2015). They had confiscated 59 guns, 550 caches of drugs, and dozens of cars and motorcycles (Bom Dia Brasil, 2015). Meanwhile, troops had engaged in 24,000 social actions and the military presence had allowed for significant upgrades to local infrastructure (G1, 2015). Overall, the state spent nearly 600 million dollars occupying Maré. And yet, within hours of the military's departure, each of the three gangs had reestablished their

⁴⁷ Josué 7/10/2014; Fulton 7/3/2014; Bruno 10/6/2014; Daniel 8/21/2014.

territorial control and dozens of *bocas de fumo* were open for business. The Police Pacification Units which had been planned for Maré never came to fruition. None of the military's development or security initiatives remained in place. If Maré's occupation was about more than just providing security for the World Cup, it was a total failure.

First, despite all of their efforts, the military was incapable of permanently weakening Maré's gangs. For one, these organizations are far too embedded in these communities for the mere imposition of force on the streets and some limited governance activities to impact their presence. Moreover, the divergent experiences of Maré's gangs demonstrate their capacity to adapt to wildly different security environments. Each of Maré's gangs survived occupation by, alternatively, remilitarizing and engaging in prolonged conflict with rivals and state forces (TCP), maintaining a significant though demilitarized presence within their turf (CV2), or maintaining only a limited presence (CV1). Public security policy must understand that these groups are incredibly resilient to such ostensive policing operations. They do not require a specific organizational form or leadership structure to operate and can effectively reproduce themselves without significant revenue streams. Conventional or even highly militarized public security approaches have largely proven incapable of effectively combatting them.

Perhaps the most important failure of occupation was that the military could not prevent inter-gang violence.⁴⁸ ADA members were able to infiltrate the area which precipitated the remilitarization of the TCP gang. In turn, the military responded by entering homes, threatening and abusing residents, and imposing a highly coercive form of order. Such tactics directly contradicted the military's efforts to gain the support and cooperation of local residents. By the end of occupation, much of the population within Maré had become disillusioned with the military presence. According to a local NGO leader speaking at a public meeting, 'The

⁴⁸ The homicide rate did fall from 21 to 5 per 100,000 according to the Institute of Public Security (G1, 2015).

“Pacification” of Maré was a lie and an abstract term that doesn’t reflect the reality. ... They haven’t implemented more responsive institutions and although they have sought out civil society to develop relationships, this is more in theory and serves as subterfuge for them to control the space.’⁴⁹

The military failed to reduce the power and influence of Maré’s gangs because they did not gain the trust and cooperation of these communities. The development and infrastructure projects in which the state engaged were important but did little to address the real sources of precarity and insecurity which residents experience in these neighborhoods. For one, young men and adolescents from favelas, cannot be merely controlled through arrest, detention, and stop and search procedures. They must be engaged and reincorporated into community structures or programs. Instead, numerous young boys and adolescents felt further marginalized during this period and quickly became disillusioned with occupation. Many have since become gang members themselves. As long as the gangs have such a constant and unending source of expendable labor it is difficult to envision their influence and control waning.

Moreover, policies that seek to wrest territorial control from these organizations must also understand the significant financial and governance benefits which these organizations provide to local residents. While gangs are responsible for much violence and crime in these neighborhoods, they simultaneously control them. The increase in low-level crime during occupation attests to the important role that gangs play within these neighborhoods. Gang control is especially important for the behavior of young boys and adolescents. In the CV2 area, frequent confrontations between increasingly frustrated and marginalized youth and the military demonstrates how social disorganization may, in fact, increase when gang control and authority are removed from an area (see Arias and Barnes 2017). Moreover, gangs provide access to illicit

⁴⁹ Public security meeting 11/5/2014.

and informal economies. Many favela residents earn their livelihoods from such sources and curtailing access further encourages support for gangs. Overall, scholars and policymakers must recognize the central institutional role that many gangs play in marginalized neighborhoods if they are to craft a more effective set of public policies to combat them.

Finally, the occupation of Maré provided the military an opportunity to further apply and refine a methodology and set of tactics developed over the past two decades, both domestically and internationally. While their efforts clearly failed in providing the kind of transformative change the state had promised, military officials characterized the operation as an unequivocal success (Ghali, 2017). In this way, the occupation of Maré served to solidify and expand the role of the military in policing Rio de Janeiro's favelas. In fact, just two years later, the military was handed control of Rio's entire public security apparatus. Over the course of a year, they employed many of the same tactics and strategies which they had refined in Maré, largely without the developmental rhetoric. Maré's occupation, then, takes on added significance as it represents the further legitimation of military intervention in the domestic sphere and foreshadowed the even more aggressive and violent efforts to control favela populations and spaces being applied currently.

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