First of all, the study of literary objectiveness is to distinguish its subject-matter
from theoretical problems associated with philosophical objectiveness. To highlight this
distinction, one has to begin by recalling the wide range of definitions of philosophical
objectiveness and the different ways in which various philosophical schools and
conceptions have approached the notion of the object. Everyday consciousness assumes the
‘objectivity’ of the existing world to be permanent. Philosophical schools
‘only’ differ through the philosophical concepts reflecting upon this
objectivity (1). Each philosophical school has, therefore, its own
understanding of objectiveness. Thus the epistemological orientation of criticist
philosophical schools has practically prevented them from developing a positive concept of
the concrete aspects of objectiveness (2). The specific
understanding of objectiveness adopted by universalist philosophies of history is also
well-known. The most prominent representative of these, Hegel’s philosophy of
history. The notion of the object put forth by classical positivism can be divided into
two sub-types. First, a definition of the object characterised by the tendentious
scientific orientation of certain positivist philosophies (3).
Second, a definition relying on the idea of ‘real complexes’, which is a
theoretical generalization of the positivist method (4). A number of
modern philosophical approaches have argued that objectiveness as such is in crisis (5).
The different object-definitions put forth by great philosophical schools may be
relevant to the notion of the object in literature and literary criticism in two ways. The
first will only be mentioned here in general terms. The various object-definitions of
great philosophical schools may often inform the intellectual universe of both author and
reader (6). Secondly, a more explicit and concrete connection is
witnessed by the almost trivial fact that the various object-definitions advocated by
great philosophical schools gain aesthetic concretization in aesthetics written in the
vein and terminology of these systems of thought. The existence of the genre of so-called
philosophical aesthetics can be seen as a proof of this argument (7).
The present crisis of literary objectiveness resembles the nature of the crisis of
modernity in general. It is particularly strongly reminiscent, however, of the numerous
former crises of literary objectiveness in the twentieth century. The crisis of
objectiveness in literature and literary criticism does not only offer the possibility of,
but even necessitates an analysis of this development in the context of a general critique
of culture (Kulturkritik) (8).
Major philosophies, aesthetic systems, founded on the theoretical groundwork laid down
by these philosophies, as well as established schools of literary theory all avow a
different concept of the literary object. While this definition should help us to
understand the phenomenon of crisis of literary objectiveness, it should also retain a
general significance. In other words, it should not be possible to object that only a
‘normative’ conception of literature yields the hypothesis of an overall
literary crisis (9).
All literary works are by definition singular and individual (10).
Furthermore, definitions of literary objectiveness have always rested on a highly
conventional basis. When accepting or rejecting literary works, the reading public does
not evaluate according to definite and objective criteria, but taking the radical
singularity of literary works into account (11). The plurality of
literary objectiveness is closely related to these features (12).
Even if literary objectiveness itself is in crisis, these attributes of literary
objectiveness remain intact, since they are constitutive features of literary
objectiveness. If they lost validity, the specifically literary character of literary
objectiveness would be fundamentally challenged. New approaches to the literary object,
which manifest themselves as crisis phenomena, will be absorbed among the countless forms
of objectiveness of radical conventionalism (13). Strictly speaking,
there are no procedures at our disposal (that is, a set of values to serve as a potential
foundation to these procedures) that would allow us to distinguish the objectiveness of
‘crisis’ from the essentially unlimited objectiveness of the radically
conventionalist approach (14). I will start the discussion of the
crisis of objectiveness by pointing out the following features:
(i) the decline, and in some cases, almost total disappearance of traditional literary
objectiveness has been manifest since the 1970s;
(ii) this decline of traditional forms of literary objectiveness has not been
accompanied by the emergence of new alternative forms of objectiveness (hence the above
described deadlock of scientific logic);
(iii) in a logical sense, perhaps the most positive and most obvious feature of the
crisis of literary objectiveness is that literary works of the period in question do not
conquer or open up new realms of the literary object, but they define themselves instead
on the basis of formerly established patterns of objectivity;
(iv) another discernible feature of the crisis of literary objectiveness is that new
representations of objectiveness not only relate to and contrast themselves with former
objectivenesss, but show a marked tendency to refer in an almost deictic fashion to
concepts of previous literary epochs.
Consequently, the crisis of traditional objectiveness (15) may be
described in terms of two features. First, the new literary objectiveness, evolving in the
prevailing crisis, regards previous representations of objectiveness as its primary
object. The first fundamental feature of the crisis of literary objectiveness is,
therefore, that traditional ‘worldlike’(16) objectiveness
is replaced by an objectiveness that in the main defines antecedent forms of literary
objectiveness as its object. A former meta-language has thus become the object language of
literature (17). The consequences of the second crucial feature of
the crisis of literary objectiveness are no less essential: the new type of literary
objectiveness is determined by a reflective process on the the value judgements and
standards associated with former instances of literary objectiveness.
The crisis of literary objectiveness can be placed in a wider context of cultural
criticism. The Kulturkritik may certainly have some relevance to the present area of
investigation as well (18).
The crisis of literary objectiveness fundamentally challenges and questions the
subject-matter of literary theory. It is worth noting once again the opposition of
meta-language and object language, already referred above. Primary literary objectiveness
supplies the object language, whereas the theory of literature provides the meta-language.
One may argue that if something lacks an object, then that thing itself cannot be said to
exist (19). Literary objectiveness is barely able to produce an
adequate definition of itself (20).
Gadamer’s hermeneutic philosophy (21) avoids the problem of
literary objectiveness altogether. Ultimately, objectiveness in literature (art) is
dissolved in the objectiveness of other fields (22). In contrast to
‘natural’ objectiveness and objectivenesss based on various societal
conventions, the legitimacy of a literary work is solely guaranteed by its elements being
organized in accordance with the rules of literary objectiveness. Thus when the crisis of
literary objectiveness intensifies, literariness will also find itself in a crisis. This
process is also responsible for the fact that new literary formations increasingly tend to
be integrated into other areas of life (e.g. religion, morals, societal practice,
commercial fields etc.) (23).
When literary objectiveness ceases, however, to be understood as a system constituted
by various objective formations aiming to correspond in one way or another to the
‘world’, scientific analysis of literary objectiveness will be rendered
impossible (24). The arbitrariness of new forms of literary
objectiveness, arising from a lack of objective organisation, essentially undermines the
requirement of scientific verification (25). Furthermore, the
impossibility of scientific verification in the wake of the crisis of objectiveness
parallels the crisis of objectiveness in music, painting and other arts (26).
Although Gadamer spends little time on the topic, it can be said that his hermeneutics
does not attribute particular theoretical relevance to literary objectiveness on two
grounds. First, he mentions briefly the ‘crisis of the picture, ... evoked by the
existence of the modern industrial and administrative state.’ (27).
Second, Gadamer explicitly argues that the scientific approach proves to be inadequate in
the analysis of artistic experience: ‘We lose sight of the... actual experience of
playing... if we reflect... as spectators on the concept forming the basis of the
performance’(28). On the one hand, Gadamer is right in saying
that the approach of the recipient is different from that of literary ‘science’.
This anti-reflexive attitude results in the categorical rejection of a scientific
orientation, but he seems to overemphasize an otherwise correct thesis on the
non-reflexive character of artistic experience. It must not be understood, however, in a
literal sense. Not even in the most ecstatic reception of a work of art can be said to be
entirely devoid of reflexion of any kind (29).
What is at issue is to understand the relationship of Gadamer’s theory to the
problem of literary objectiveness in general, and to the crisis of literary objectiveness
in particular (30).
It is the anti-mimetic and Platonic character of Gadamer’s aesthetic hermeneutics
that determines the status of literary (artistic) objectiveness. The following is the most
important passage illustrating this point: "The thing shown is here—this is the
basic mimetic relationship... Considering all this, it may be concluded that the
epistemological significance of mimesis is re-cognition... Thus we have reached the
central theme of Platonism. In his doctrine on anamnesis, Plato has presented the mythical
conception of re-cognition..." (31). What is of crucial
importance, however, is to point out that this aesthetics entails a fundamental reduction
of the significance of literary objectiveness. If all attention is directed to what is
re-cognised, the thing to be re-cognised loses significance (32).
Gadamer’s following thesis offers a concise and thus unavoidably superficial
approach to the object-problem: "...due to the development of the scientific concept
of reality, mimesis lost its (original) aesthetic validity..." (33).
The question of what is shown by showing is necessarily deemed to be of secondary
importance (34). Gadamer describes an objective relationship in
which there is no distinction made between these three aspects of a work of art: the
objective-mimetic potential of a work of art, the actuality of the act of showing, and the
environment of this actuality. Gadamer explicitly states the dissolution of objectiveness
in ‘showing’: " A twofold lack of distinction corresponds to the
distinction between poetry and substance, between poetry and performance—a unity(!)
of the truth that is learned in the game of art." (35)
The seemingly inseparable unity of ‘imitation’ and ‘showing’ is
sometimes deliberately upset at the expense of the mimetic idea and practice: "The
mode of existence of an image ought to be defined more precisely by distinguishing the way
in which representation relates to the original in an image from the relationship of
reproduction, the reference of the image to the original." (36)
The instance of ‘showing’ (in this context, that of ‘presentation’)
is now positively foregrounded, and the reference of the image to the original object (in
this context, to the ‘model’) is held to be of only secondary importance. It
should also be clear, however, that this approach leads to a series of problems. It
reaches beyond the areas of literature, aesthetics and philosophy, and assumes a unique
religious character (37). The whole ontological relationship of
original (model) and image is reversed: "The ontological relationship of original and
image must be radically altered or even reversed... Strictly speaking, the original object
only becomes a model through the image" (38). It is not the
characteristics of the ‘original’ that constitute the image, but in effect the
image turns the original into an original. Not objectiveness makes a work of art possible,
but a work of art lends objects their objectiveness (39).
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