Aristotle's ethics is determined by his notion of communities which are
determined by hundreds of topics in his Topics—sameness and difference, part
and whole, better than, etc.. The topics are tools for all dialectical investigations into
being and action (viz. I.11 104b2) for they secure definitions and get at essences of
things or their aspects. Reflecting structures of being and good, the topics can get at
objective reality and good. Being tools for all investigations, we are not free to reject
them or we cannot have any discourse or claim to reality or good. I show how permutating
the combination of these topics allow for subsequent 'sub-communities' which are common
to some. I offer an Aristotelian explanation for the origin of these topics and
conclude that ethics is determined by communities, which in turn are determined by
education.
The Topics seeks to discover a method by which we reason(1)
from generally accepted opinions (endox_n) about any problem (100a18-19,
100a30-b18)—i.e., dialectical reasoning. By "generally accepted
opinions,"Aristotle means the kind of "opinion held by everyone or by the
majority or by the wise—either all of the wise or the majority or the most famous of
them—and which is not paradoxical; for one would accept the opinion of the wise, if
it is not opposed to the views of the majority" (104a8-13). Since Aristotle contrasts
dialectical reasoning with demonstrative reasoning which proceeds from true and primary
premises (100a27-28) and are supported by the "things themselves," it seems easy
to suppose that dialectic cannot get us to objective first principles.(2)
However, that Aristotle believes in the objectivity of dialectic is apparent in Topics
I.18 where he discusses the usefulness to clarity of examining various meanings of a term.
The topic examining various meanings of a term continues to be employed throughout the Topics.
Such an examination ensures that "our reasonings shall be in accordance with the actual
facts (kat' auto to pragma) and not addressed merely to the term used"
(108a17-22). In I.11, he speaks of the contribution of dialectic to "choice and
avoidance, or to truth and knowledge" (104b2). Finally, dialectical propositions are
constituted by definitions which capture a thing's essence (101b38). By procuring the
right propositions through correct definitions, the outcome of dialectical reasoning would
be objective. This means that dialectic can provide us with truth and knowledge about
reality and the good, rather than just a bunch of opinions which merely cohere.
Dialectic gives us truth and goodness, how are these ascertained?
Aristotle answers this question in Topics I.4. Dialectical arguments begin with
propositions or problems (101b15, 104a3-4), and reasonings reason about problems.
Propositions and problems are similar for they are constituted by the following four
predicables. The predicables are a property, or a definition, or a genus, or an accident.
The four predicables together, i.e., in some combination, rather than each taken
by itself, constitute propositions or problems. These four are important because they
contribute to our understanding of a substance, or any of the nine categories of quantity,
quality, relation, place, time, position, state, activity, and passivity (viz. Topics
I.9 103b23-24). Definition is the focus of all predicables so that directly or indirectly,
the predicables give us definitions (viz. Topics I.6).
Aristotle maintains that every proposition or problem tells us about
a genus, or a peculiarity, or an accident. What is peculiar is divisible into that
which tells us something's essence and is a definition; and that which does not tell us
the essence though it belongs to the thing alone. This latter is called a property. Both a
definition and a property are predicated convertibly of the thing (viz. Posterior
Analytics I.22, 83a23-24, Topics 102a18-20), and they constitute in part the
kind of materials from which dialectical reasonings start. For instance, the definition of
man can constitute a dialectical proposition as follows: '"An animal that walks on
two feet" is the definition of man, is it not?' (101b30) Whether such a proposition
is examined dialectically depends on whether the thesis is one that is puzzling to those
who need argument (105a2-4, viz. 104a3ff or chapter 10).(3)
Knowledge of the definition of a thing which all four predicables
discussed contribute is crucial because Aristotle says that people cannot argue
dialectically unless they are directed at the same thing or the actual
fact ( Topics I.18, 108a17-23, 105a31-33). It is clear how definitions give us
essences. But the other three predicables also contribute to definition because they can
destroy it if the propositions they make up are proven otherwise. Aristotle says,
We must not fail to observe that all remarks made in criticism
of a 'property' and 'genus' and 'accident' will be applicable to 'definition' as well. For
when we have shown that the attribute in question fails to belong only to the term defined
. . . we shall have demolished the definition; . . . all the points we have enumerated
might in a certain sense be called 'definitory' (Topics, I.6, 102b27-35).
The lesson is that dialectic gets its materials from being and its
aspects—namely, its genus, property, and accident. The being revealed is an objective
reality or good that is accessible to us. Aristotle's talk of definition which captures
the essence shows that there are things with essences in the world. For instance, he tells
us that the investigation of sameness and difference helps us define things and recognize
what a particular thing is (viz. 108a36-108b25). Given that the genus captures the
sameness of different objects, it too contributes to the definition. By the same token,
recognizing the differentia proper to a thing (108b6) entails recognizing the things that
are peculiar but not essential, and those that are accidental. By examining the predicates
that tell us essences, distinguishing such predicates from those which might seem
to tell us essences but just capture the thing's properties or accidents, dialectic
distinguishes a thing's essence and accidents. Once we know an essence, we can categorize
it with, or separate it from others, and know it better.
The further fact that Aristotle is not just dealing with words or
opinions without objective reality is evident when he tells us to get clear about the
various senses in which a term might be used so that we are clear about the various
aspects of reality, or what he calls the "differences of things." (105a33)
Clarifying these sameness and difference ensures that we are directing our minds at
"actual facts" (108a21) or at "the same thing" (108a23). The whole of Topics
I.15 consists in different ways of examining if a term has several meanings or one.(4)
Dialectical investigations of sameness and difference give us definitions of beings
that are objective because of sameness and difference that are objective.(5)
Hence the procedure of (i) focusing on definitions which capture essences, genera,
properties, and accidents; (ii) looking to sameness and difference to ascertain if we are
dealing with the same or different things; and (iii) looking at the various senses of a
term (again using sameness and difference) to ensure that we are using the same sense and
hence directing our minds at the same thing; are all ways determined by the things in the
world, by their various aspects (e.g., goodness), and by their relations with other
things.
By showing the objectivity of reality and good which form the subject
matters of Aristotelian dialectic, we see that dialectic already proceeds from common
opinions based in reality and hence they cannot be rejected without risking the
possibility of giving up intelligible arguments or being. Given that dialectic gives us
being and the good through definition and hence helps make reality and the good
intelligible, we would also be giving these up if we just rejected correct dialectical
propositions freely.
From the objectivity of dialectic and how it gets at reality and the
good via definitions, the Topics is not simply a handbook of strategies that
is pure form without any matter.(6) Contrariwise, it
provides us with ways of coming up with arguments both for and against something,(7)
which ways are intimately bound up with truth and goodness because these topoi
allow us to arrive at definitions of things both practical and theoretical. That Aristotle
stresses the importance of amassing "an abundance of material" (163a5) for
arguments is significant. That definitions form a significant role in such materials is
evident when he says "(m)oreover, you should have a good supply of definitions . . .
for it is by means of these that reasonings are carried on." (163b20-23) These
materials not only lay bare the problems and make us see clearer what is at stake but they
also lead us to philosophical knowledge. Aristotle says,
Also to take and to have taken in at a glance the results of
each of two hypotheses is no mean instrument for the cult of knowledge and philosophic
wisdom; for then it only remains to make a correct choice of one of them. (VIII.15
163b9ff)
Dialectical reasoning is a means to ascertaining truth and making
correct choices about actions. We have seen how sameness and difference work as a topic.
Let us look at some other topics also useful for constructing arguments for ethical
purposes.(8) In Topics III, Aristotle discusses
topics which will aid in our choice of what is superior between two things that are
closely related. He believes that when superiority is shown, "the mind will agree
that whichever of the two alternatives is actually superior is the more worthy of
choice" (116a10-13). Some of these topics are: the lasting is more choiceworthy than
that which is less so; that which is chosen for its own sake is preferable to that which
is chosen for the sake of something else; the absolute good is better than that which is
relative to an individual; what is self-sufficient is preferable to what is not; and what
is in itself more noble is preferable to what is desirable for something else, etc..
Aristotle does not give reasons for the choiceworthiness of one of these pairs over the
other, just as he does not give reasons for employing similarity and difference, the
greater and lesser, etc. for ascertaining truth and good. He does not offer any
explanations because he thinks that these topics are obvious. Topics for constructing
arguments for and against something, or for the choice of an action, constitute the
generally accepted opinions (endoxa) for these are truly common to all in that
everyone must know them to define something and hence conduct a discussion with others.
Using the more and less permanence in our reasoning to show that of two
things, one is more permanent than another will lead to an obvious choice of action.
Implicit in everyone's understanding of permanence is that the more permanent something
is, the better it is, and this topic with its intrinsic value is not further explained due
to its clarity and acceptance by everyone (viz. 116a13-14). Aristotle continues by saying
that one should direct one's argument or discussion to showing that something is good, for
this is what determines the choice of action. He says, "for everything aims at the
good" (116a20). That everything is directed at the good needs no discussion. He also
claims that there is an absolute criterion of what is better and more choiceworthy, and
this is the better knowledge (116a22). This is an explicit statement that when it comes to
these topics, the thing that is absolutely better is already determined: such as, the more
permanent is superior to the less, what is choiceworthy for its own sake is better than
that for the sake of something else, and the absolutely or naturally good is better than
what is not by nature.(9) Due to the determinateness and
obviousness of these topics to common opinions, Aristotle employs them for ethical
investigations. Since dialectic proceeds from topics investigating definitions and leads
to truth about reality and the good, employing these topics for his ethical investigations
lets Aristotle attain the essence of good.
Let us look at Aristotle's ethics for some examples of his use of these
topics and how they determine his view of the good. Recall that dialectic proceeds from
the topics to establish propositions for arguments to reach truth. The establishment of
propositions serve the purpose of arriving at definitions. Definitions are crucial as the
following shows. "Most of the matters of controversy and puzzlement will become clear
if what happiness should be thought to be is properly defined" (1215a20-22). Since
virtue and wisdom are commonly ascribed to happiness, Aristotle says, "first we must
look into virtue and wisdom, and discover the nature of each" (1216a39-b1). He wants
to see how they are parts of the good life, either in themselves or as a result of actions
from them. Besides definitions and the topics common to all, something else is also
needed. Common opinions (endoxa) that are common to some but not all are needed
too. Endoxa that are common to some but not all are how most commentators
understand Aristotle's common opinions. I differ from them in believing that there is
another set of opinions that is common to all that form the basis of all dialectic: these
are the topics such as the greater/ lesser, the choiceworthy in itself/ the choiceworthy
for the sake of something else, etc.. However, that endoxa common to some also come
into play is evident for Aristotle says "(i)t would be superfluous to examine all the
opinions about happiness that find adherents" (1214b29). He discards children's
opinions, the views of the many, and only considers the opinions of the wise for "it
would be strange to present argument to those who need not argument, but experience"(10)
(1215a2-3).
From these passages, it is clear that Aristotle takes common opinions
that are common to some (or appearances) as starting points of his dialectic, and uses
arguments to demonstrate from those things that are correctly said. It is important that
he starts with things correctly said and not everything that has been said. This is
consistent with his considering the opinions of the wise but not the opinions of the many
who are unreflective and children. Even though Aristotle concedes that there are correct
starting points, he thinks that customary expressions of these opinions are confused. A
stark example of something that has been correctly said but expressed in confusion is
happiness. He says, "Now happiness has been agreed to be the greatest and best
of human goods" (1217a202-21). Despite the agreement on the name of happiness,
different opinions exist about the life it denotes. Aristotle notes that "everyone
attributes happiness to three lives, the political, the philosophical, and the
pleasure-loving" (1216a28-30). So despite the fact that these opinions are correct
about the highest good, they are not clear about what it is. Aristotle's task is to
construct the arguments which will demonstrate the essence of what happiness is. When one
looks at his arguments, it is clear that they proceed from the topics that are common to
all. Only by proceeding from these topics that are common to all can Aristotle say,
"Now a dialectical proposition is a question which accords with the opinion held by
everyone (pasin) . . ."(11) (103b9) Such a passage
continues with reference to topics that are common to the majority or the wise. This
supports my earlier point that topics that are common to some are needed too. But let us
first look at how the topics that are common to all aid in the definition of happiness.
In Eudemian Ethics II, Aristotle investigates the definition of
happiness. He distinguishes all goods to be within the soul or without it and maintains
that those in the soul are more choiceworthy than those outside since wisdom, virtue, and
pleasure are not only in the soul but each is also valued as an end for everyone. He then
distinguishes those things in the soul into capacities, activities, and processes.
Aristotle establishes that the excellence of these capacities, activities, or processes of
anything that has a function is the best state of the thing. But the function is better
than the state since the function is the end, and the end is the best since everything
else is chosen for its sake. Next, Aristotle distinguishes function into two types. One of
these is where the function is distinct from the exercise of the function; e.g., the
function of house-building is to have a house, not the building of one, and the function
of medicine is to have health, not the curing act. The other function is where the
function is the same as its exercise; e.g., the function of sight is seeing, and the
function of mathematical sciences is speculation. From this, Aristotle concludes that when
a thing's exercise is its function, this exercise is better than the state (even though he
does not explain here, this is because the second kind of function is the end, and the end
is the best since everything is chosen for its sake). Aristotle then identifies the
function of a thing and its excellent functioning (i.e., if it is achieving the end, then
it is doing well). He then assumes that the function of the soul is to make something
live. Since the function is the same as the excellent functioning, then the excellence of
the soul is a good life or the best activity of the best state which is virtue. He
concludes "the activity of the virtue of the soul must be the best thing"
(1219a34). But since happiness is the best thing, then happiness is the activity of a
virtuous soul. Since happiness is also agreed to be something complete, and completeness
is better than incompleteness, he concludes that happiness is the "activity of a
complete life in accordance with complete virtue" (1219a38).
In this definition of happiness, Aristotle employs sameness and
difference to construct arguments. Some distinctions made were those between what is
within from what is without the soul; states, capacities and activities; what is
choiceworthy as an end vs. what is not; two types of function; and completeness and
incompleteness. These distinctions were frequently followed with a choice of one over the
other, which choice is sometimes argued for by an appeal to some other topic (e.g., goods
within the soul are more choiceworthy because they are chosen as ends) and sometimes
asserted without arguments because it is obvious (e.g., the exercise of a function is
better than the state). When it comes to similarity or identity, he identifies a certain
exercise of a function with the function; the function and excellent functioning of a
thing; and finally, happiness with the best thing. Such identities allow him to establish
what happiness is, for being happy just is acting well and living well. Aristotle goes on
to investigate the soul in the same manner to ascertain what its virtues are.
The topics employed in the construction of arguments are the tools
Aristotle uses to define happiness dialectically. Given that these topics are accessible
to everyone and they need no explanation, they make up the class of common opinions that
are common to all and hence bind everyone together into a community which makes the kind
of discourse Aristotle engages in possible, e.g., discoursing about 'what is good or
happiness'. But from where did these topics originate? Given that they give us access to
reality and the good, we can safely deduce that reality and the good are structured by
these topics. Things theoretical and practical are constituted by parts and wholes, the
greater and the lesser, the better and the worse etc.. As a result of such objective
structures of the real and the good, we naturally have a community with everyone else
subjected to these structures. But why then do we not have just one community according to
Aristotle? Why are there sub-communities with opinions that are only common to some?
Besides, are these topics as common as Aristotle thinks? Perhaps everyone could agree that
there are parts and there are wholes, and there are contraries; but does everyone buy into
the notion that things within the soul are better than things bodily?, functions are
better than states, etc. ?
It seems that even Aristotle realizes that not everyone is sold on the
priority of one of the pairs over the other. Such differences in opinions about those
topics that are supposedly common to all is due to a lack of education. That is why he
considers the opinions of the wise rather than those of children and the many, and he does
not try to argue with those who need experience. Despite the fact that a dialectical
investigation into happiness starts from common opinions, he does not think that a young
person, or a person who is mature in years but not in character, is a qualified student of
ethics. He demands that a student of ethics have experience of the actions about which
political science argues, and he be not misled by his feelings but be guided by reason
(viz. Nicomachean Ethics I.3 1095a3-12). He also demands that the student must have
had a good upbringing in order to have the proper origins. An origin takes the form of
believing that something is true even though we do not have the reason why it is true (NE
I.4 1095b4-13). Again, he maintains the significance of having the right origins as
follows:
Just as in other cases everyone goes in search with something in
hand, we must so conduct our search that we try to arrive at what is said truly and
clearly through things said truly but not clearly. At the moment we are placed as we
should be if we knew that health was the best disposition of the body and that Coriscus
was the swarthiest person in the market-place; we do not know what either of these things
is, but it is helpful, in order to know what each of them is, to be so placed.
It seems that we need certain sorts of presuppositions in order to
proceed with dialectical investigations. Since dialectic begins with common opinions, we
need to have the correct common opinions, i.e., those tied to the way the world and good
are, in order to begin investigations. The necessity for such correct opinions holds for
both the topics (i.e., the common opinions that are common to all, e.g., one must
know that what is permanent is preferable to what is transient) and the common opinions
that are common to some (e.g., things correctly/ truly said, rather than anything
at all). It turns out that education or a good upbringing, is the solution to recognizing
the topics for what they are, and hence in forming the community that is common to all.
This is not surprising because this is actually the end of human beings for Aristotle,
i.e., to become virtuous both morally and intellectually. Education should also be able to
take care of differences in opinions that are only common to some, such as the uneducated
who follows his desires and think that pleasure is the highest good. However, another way
of being mistaken even if one has the correct upbringing, is, if one considers an issue by
using certain topics and not others. E.g., in thinking about happiness, one could arrive
at pleasure as the best candidate if one does not take into account the topics of
completeness and self-sufficiency. Such errors could be removed by ensuring that one uses
all the relevant topics for his investigations.
In conclusion, studying ethics for Aristotle, relies on two types of
community. The basic community consists in opinions that are common to all. These opinions
turn out to be the hundreds of topics that are necessary for dialectical reasoning. He
also uses sub-communities of common opinions that are common to some in dialectic. These
stem from good upbringing which gives one true views which are not yet clearly expressed
for one does not know the reason of these views. One gets clear about these true views by
employing dialectical reasoning using those topics that are common to all. However, given
that even these topics which are supposed to be common to all are not always so, I provide
an Aristotelian solution. The solution is one of education and the creation of a community
that is common to all by educating them to become aware of the topics that are common to
all. This answer is consistent with Aristotle's view because he recognizes that even
though certain things are by nature, interferences could prevent our reaching our end (Physics
199b15-18). Education is just a way of removing such interferences. This is consistent
with Aristotle's view that the intellectual virtues are the highest good or end for human
beings, which end takes teaching and habituation to attain. So ethics for Aristotle is
dependent on community (which makes possible dialectical reasoning), and community is in
turn dependent on education.
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