I. Bringing Ontology Of The World And Cognition Together
The issues of ontology and cognition are tackled in a separate manner. "As I try
to think about the issues in cognition, I try to exclude the issues about how the world
is" is an often adopted attitude.
This does not mean that investigation of the mind would be extraneous to ontological
questions. Quite to the contrary. A respectable contemporary philosopher would normally
adopt physicalism as a hypothesis about the mind, thus embracing a materialist ontology. A
materialist treats organisms possessing mind as parts of the physical world. The way how
the problem is posited then generates a question about the persisting explanatory gap, or
about the reductionist hard problem: All in being treated as a part of the world,
organisms possessing mind still differ from the World in that they have consciousness
consisting of qualitative experiences which are not reducible to the physical World. So
one may wish to be a nonreductionist concerning the ontology of mind.
Endorsing nonreductionism is desirable. But not because of particular and exemplar
structure of mind as persistently mysterious qualitative part of organisms. Rather,
nonreductionism is desirable because of the fact that organisms are parts of the world
themselves. So there is nothing to be reduced in organisms: there is no candidate part of
organisms such as their minds which would still somehow not be a part of the structure of
the world. To put it bluntly, you can not reduce a bottle to a bottle. You have to
paraphrase the expression "bottle" in some other vocabulary, and one possibility
is to adopt the vocabulary of contemporary physics. You can not reduce biological stuff to
biological stuff. You have to paraphrase the biological vocabulary into another one, such
as the vocabulary of physics. The real bottom line is that you can not reduce physical
stuff to the physical stuff. The reason is very simple if you are a materialist and
physicalist. At the bottom, there is nothing else around as the physical stuff. But it is
possible, and indeed it is true that the physical stuff is very richly structured. Just
imagine that one kind of physical stuff are such complicated things as minds.
The intricated structure of minds, particularly the complicated topography of their
multi-dimensional space, such as it occurs in Morphological Content, is ultimately
responsible for qualitative experiences that are at the gist of the so called hard problem
of consciousness. As the space of Morphological Content is itself a part of the physical
World, it can explain the hard problem or the qualitative states — as products of
encounter of one form of physical stuff, organisms, with the rest of the physical stuff
around them.
Some surfaces in the World, such as surface of this rock, get moulded and shaped while
they encounter another surfaces in the World, particularly surfaces of other rocks that
get into their way. But as the World has many dimensions, some surfaces are quite richer
than others. One such surface is physically based Morphological surface. Its many
dimensions are shaped through species' generic encounters. The purpose of the shaping is
the tacit expectation of further encounters with surfaces in the world. There is nothing
mysterious in this. Look at the physical structure of this leaflet of straw, or at these
leaves. Their form proceeds from anticipation of further encounters with the kinds of
surfaces and pressures that it has already encountered. Compare that also surface of the
rock gets moulded and shaped in such a way that its future encounters with similar
surfaces will get smoother. In the same sense, the multi dimensional surface of the
mathematical-state transitions in organisms as parts of the world was shaped in such a way
that encounters with similar kinds of surfaces will be facilitated in the future. The same
holds for linguistic ability of organisms: this ability is actually grounded in a
multi-dimensional abstract surface that anticipates further encounters of the surfaces of
a kind.
So this is the first idea how to explain mind as a part of the World. The basic
supposition is that there is just one World, and similarly as some chunks of the World are
formed so that they become McDonald eateries, other chunks are trees, and some of them are
minds. All these chunks of the world come in different shapes and densities, they are
variously thick, but all they are physical stuff, which is ultimately explainable by the
help of physical forces and configurations.
Representations are abstract spaces that are shaped in order to expect the encounter of
surfaces of a kind. Mind is explained in the mainstream literature ontologically, as a
kind of physical stuff. Nevertheless this still leaves the possibility to see it as not
quite a kind of stuff, for it is intertwined with qualitative experiences and with the
hard problem of consciousness. It is nevertheless possible to treat mind including
qualitative experiences as a part of the physical World, which really is One World, the
hard problems included.
It is natural to endorse ontology — usually materialist and physicalist — in
the philosophy of mind. But one abhors somehow to face the consequence that mind is really
a part of the World. One takes escape by producing hard problems, the ultimate refuge for
seeing mind as something special.
All in endorsing the study of mind in ontological terms, contemporary materialists
abhor the very idea that ontology of the World would be important for the study of the
mind (as a part of the World). It was not always like that. Phenomenologists, starting
with Brentano, and continuing with Husserl, Heidegger and many others, studied the mind as
an ontology of the World. This approach needs to be elaborated. The basis for this may be
provided by Parmenidean Materialism such as proposed by Terry Horgan. Endorsing
Parmenidean Materialism first implies to endorse Materialism, which provides a welcome
methodological treatment of Phenomenological projects. They are engaged in ontology, but
their efforts are often put into question by their endorsement of dualism. The proposal is
to leave no such escape in the World as One Material entity.
If cognition is in the World, and if the World in all of its dimensions is material,
then the question is how one material dimensions of the World relate to other material
dimensions of the World. One may see the vicinity of this problem to the problem of
intentionality. This problem may be solved by looking closer at the structure of the mind.
There is a multi dimensional space at the level of mathematical state transitions
description of organisms. Multi dimensional abstract space is a part of the World, and it
is shaped with previous and anticipated encounters with other parts of this very complex
World.
II. The Chunking of the World as Done by the Mind Depends on how the World Is
This sounds like correspondence claim. It may be. But consider that according to the
revious discussion we have to understand the World as One entity. Thus the World also
encompasses the mind. Now it is reasonable to suppose that the mind as a part of the World
is richly structured. But the World, although One, is richly structured as well. The mind
as a part of the World continuously encounters variations in the structure of the World.
Mind gets shaped by these encounters, and being shaped means moulding its structure so
that similar encounters may be anticipated, so that future encounters (of surfaces) would
be handled as smoothly as possible. World as a Blobject continuously endures many changes,
and these changes follow constraints posed by the fact that the
World is material and physically-complex-entity. If this is right, then the
mind—the morphology of the mind's space — is indeed shaped by the (rest of the)
World, by how the World is. This is not the classical correspondence any more.
Although the World is One, it may and indeed it does have many regions. The World is a
rich structure. One may see many dimensions of the abstract space of the mind being shaped
modularily, in order to fit these regions as appropriately as possible.
III. The World is One Object, but not a Simple One
One first reaction to the Parmenidean claim that there is One World may be that the
World is simple. We are used to see individuals as simple. But it is not certain that
the World is individual. It may be that the World is not really divisible, for if this
would be the case it would not be One. And it certainly does not follow that a thing, if
it is one, is simple. Suppose that computer is one thing; in no way it seems to be simple.
It has many parts. Parts have several intertwined relations. Program constantly transforms
the activity of the computer.
IV. Morphological Content is Just Right to Allow Organisms Moving in the World to do
the Appropriate Dynamical Chunking
It is very important that all in being parts of the World, organisms have a peculiar
property of moving in the World, constantly transforming and moulding the abstract
multi-dimensional space and representations responsible for encounter with a certain kind
of surfaces in the World.
It is a natural supposition then to claim that the abstract morphology of the
mathematical-state transitions is shaped in such a way that it allows encountering the
transformations in the World through movement. Husserl has analyzed movement as an
integral part of perception, and proposed to see the abstract phenomenological space
responsible for construction of things. Study of deictic pointers recognizes bodily
movement succeeding at the rate of one third of a second, such as saccadic eye movement,
as determining the shaping of representations, which have themselves to be seen as
abstract multi dimensional overall cognitive space of organisms.
Particularly deicitc pointers show that the abstract space is made for adapting to the
future encounters with surfaces in the World. The natural tendency for cognitive systems
is to chunk the word at the mathematical-transition level.
V. From the Perspective of the Higher Cognition World Tends to Appear as
Consisting of Several Separate Objects
Things look different from the perspective of higher cognition. In order to make sense
of the encounters with the transforming world, organisms tend to interpret transformations
of the world which is really a jello, as genuine chunks. But this is mistaken, if the
World is One: there really are no chunks. However, it is a cognitive tendency, rooted in
the deictically formed shape of the abstract mathematical level of cognition, to perceive
separate objects. Troubles with vagueness show that such supposition of separately
existing objects is really mistaken.
Horgan has adopted the attitude of quantifying with one's fingers crossed. This simply
means that we suppose there to be entities, many individual objects in the World. But
actually there are none. There is the tendency to see objects as separate, a tendency
rooted in the deictic components of abstract morphology of the mathematical space level.
Q: If two billiard balls hit each other, it is difficult to deny that there are two
separate objects involved. If a car hits you, the same follows.
A: It does not follow. Suppose that just this amount of jello exist. You can take some
chunks. Are there many jellos now? No, it is at least possible to claim that these are
transformations of One Jello. In the same sense, car and you are transformations of the
complex World. One complex World is not simple. So several transformations may and do
appear in it. From the perspective of you higher cognition, these transformations may
appear as separate chunks, a tendency formed by your encounters with previously
encountered transformations.
VI. The General Project
Let us not forget the general project. It has to be shown that the abstract
multi-dimensional space at the mathematical-transitions level is just right for an
organism's encounters with the world. The World and its ontology thus matters for an
account of cognition. This is actually nothing else than the principle of hand and glove
fit of "the Fundamental Principle of Cognitive Design" (HT, p. 154). Just that
the fit between mathematical and cognitive levels has to be supported by the ontological
structure of the World. But World is not a collection of objects, as interpretations of
the cognitive level, induced with topography of the mathematical level invite us to
conclude. World is a continuous transformation according to points governed by laws of
physical structure. Thus it is important for study of mind to embrace the dynamical
physical systems perspective, in order to account for the World. It has to be shown that
cognitive project can not succeed without the ontological, Parmenidean Materialist one.
VII. Objection Considered: No Ontology is Really Needed if One Stays with the
Mathematical and Cognitive State Transition Levels
It may be objected in the following way to the overall project of bringing
cognition and ontology of the World together. There is no need to bring the World into an
account of mind, because first, the correlations needed, such as the one introduced by the
Fundamental Principle of Cognitive Design, are just correlations between the levels of the
cognitive architecture. So mathematical level needs to match the cognitive level, but not
the World. And secondly, even if we suppose that instead of cognitive level we would need
the World, the World would not be needed at all, for we are dealing with a model of mind.
But models of mind are only plausibly interpreted internalistically. So again the World
and its ontology is not needed.
The response to these objections is as follows. If the basic correlations would be only
between levels of description in models of mind, then it is hard to see why they would be
needed. One can make a story about levels to match, i.e., mathematical level to support
the cognitive level. But if only cognitive levels would be concerned, there would be no
reason for performing chunking at all. Correlations between two cognitive levels would be
a mere formal play. But this most probably is not the case, because the reason for
performing such correlations would then be absent. So there must be some correlation with
the rest of the World. As against this, it may be remarked that there is no such shaping
according to the World necessary, as the World is One, and so organism is not different to
it. But consider the following. Let us presume that there is a car, and that it has
several parts. In this way of talking we may then continue to affirm that it is very
important where a particular part will be in the whole of the car, for otherwise the car
would not function, and precisely in order to fix comparable arrangements we pay our
mechanic. So the arrangement of parts in the overall structure of a car matters. In the
same sense, the arrangement of minds in the overall structure of the World matters as
well. It is important that they fit. Nonobstantly that in the deep ontology there are no
cars or minds at all, but just One World.
What about the claim concerning plausibility of internalism, based on the claim that we
are dealing with models of mind? One can be internalist in a model of mind. But still, the
only reason to be structured is to match the structure of the rest of the World.
VIII. Objection: You do not really Need Morphological Content in Your Ontological
Story
Q: Why would you need Morphological Content at all? All you need are cognitive-state
transitions. They seem to directly interact with the world.
A: I need Morphological Content. It gives the background to the touch of an organism at
its cognitive level surface with surfaces encountered in the world. Otherwise it would be
as if the surface would not be supported by any structure. It would be as if two rocks
hitting at each other's surfaces would be able to perform this without any bodily physical
structure, just the surfaces being there. Each contact needs some background physical
structure. There are no rocks consisting just of surfaces. There are no cognitive
encounters without the background of Morphological Content.
Q: But what is the actual job of the Morphological Content? It seems to be somewhat
like inductively practically putting together of items without recognizing them to be
tokens of a type. I practically range A to be close to B without forming any concept or
general representation of AB.
A: This practical response shows that whatever appears at cognitive surface is
supported by the morphological background.
IX. Objection: You do not really Need Cognitive Transition Level in Your Ontological
Story
Q: Let us suppose that you need mathematical transition level. But then you will have
direct resonance between this level and between the landscape of the World. In this case
there will be no need for you to buy the cognitive-transitions level.
A: Wrong. I will still need cognitive transition level. For it has to fulfil the
cognitive function of translating the potential multi dimensional space of mathematical
state transitions in such way that they will actually interact with regions of the World.
The job of mathematical transition levels is to provide a landscape indicating several
potential responses to the World. Whereas cognitive-state transitions level actualizes
TCS's (total cognitive states) to deal with the momentary surfaces of the World that I
encounter.
X. Comparison of Morphological Content with the Dynamical Landscape
Morphological Content and its landscape pushes from level below to the upper cognitive
level. Each instance at the cognitive level is supported by the whole structure of the
landscape.
If I think "This is a dog", but in the landscape of the morphological space,
dog is close to the cat and to many other items, all these items support the appearance of
TCS This is a dog. But they do not support the cognitive space explicitly, rather like a
part of the iceberg submersed into water supports its peak. This is close to Freudian
metaphors of consciousness being supported by a large underwater structured body of
unconscious.
XI. Bodily Movement as Shaping of Representations
A specific level of abstraction in forming of representations may be attributed to the
bodily movements, such as saccadic eye movements, that succeed at one third of a second
time scale. This bodily movement leads to deicitc peaks in the morphological landscape.
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