Introduction
This treatise is a contribution towards the understanding of why humankind cannot agree
on the foundation of morality and why moral pluralism is the logical constitution of moral
reality. The synergistic-reflective-equilibrium model is the model that will describe how
persons can make moral decisions as pluralistic agents. If this model is correct, then it
will not be a new discovery, rather, it will be a new description of how pluralistic
agents do in fact make moral decisions. This synergistic-reflective-equilibrium
description should then be useful not only in giving a fuller understanding of how moral
decisions ought to be made, but also how moral philosophy can be united into a pluralistic
collective whole.
I. The Synergistic-Reflective-Equilibrium Model
 The
synergistic-reflective-equilibrium model is the position in which the justification of
what is right or wrong is done by using neither a pure theory model, nor a pure intuition
model. The synergistic-reflective-equilibrium model is a back-and-forth
process—starting with particulars and going to the general and back to the
particulars and so on and so forth. This is a constant process that never really comes to
closure as new decisions are constantly having to be made. As Kant said:
Virtue is always in progress and yet always starts from the beginning.
–It is always in progress because, considered objectively, it is an ideal and
unattainable, while yet constant approximation to it is a duty. That it always starts from
the beginning has a subjective basis in human nature, which is affected by
inclinations because of which virtue can never settle down in peace and quiet with its
maxims adopted once and for all but, if it is not rising, is unavoidably sinking. For,
moral maxims, unlike technical ones cannot be based on habit (since this belongs to the
natural constitution of the will’s determination); on the contrary, if the practice
of virtue were to become a habit the subject would suffer loss to that freedom in
adopting his maxims which distinguishes an action done from duty. (1)
The synergistic-reflective-equilibrium model synergistically combines the theory model
and the intuition model using the process of reflective-equilibrium. It combines the
covering-precept model in which justification is from the "top-down", and the
individual-case model in which justification is from the bottom-up, using the process of
reflective-equilibrium in which individuals take their accepted intuitions, norms, and
theories, mirror them back and forth, making appropriate changes, until an equilibrium or
balance is achieved.
II. Mid-Level Principles And The Synergistic-Reflective-Equilibrium
Model
 When
adopting this synergistic-reflective-equilibrium model, there is a natural development of
"mid-level principles". These are abstract principles that are justified by both
the theory model and the intuition model. These mid-level principles will be either
derived from, congruent with, or at least not in conflict with the theories and/or
intuitions. These mid-level principles are partial substantive developments of abstract or
ethereal theories, and the partial theory development of practical or intuitional choices
resulting in principles that are easily accessible on a regular basis.
Mid-level principles may be likened to that of Mill’s secondary principles. Mill
believed that people live most of their lives by appealing to secondary principles. It is
only when there are conflicting secondary principles that there is ever the need to appeal
to the primary principle of utility—the greatest happiness principle. We must
remember that only in these cases of conflict between secondary principles is it requisite
that first principles should be appealed to. There is no case of moral obligation in which
some secondary principle is not involved. (2)
Kant in his Metaphysics of Morals divides his investigation of the doctrine of
duties into two parts. The first three-fifths of the book is devoted to The Doctrine of
Right which deals with individual rights, or duties that are established by external
laws, i.e., judicially. The second two-fifths of the book is devoted to The Doctrine of
Virtue which deals with ethics or duties that cannot be given by external laws. The
following quotes show how the differences between the doctrine of right and the doctrine
of virtue comes about through the use of the synergistic-reflective-equilibrium model.
One can think of the relation of end to duty in two ways: one can begin with the
end [intuitive choices] and seek out the maxim of actions [mid-level principles] in
conformity with duty [theory] [bottom-up or intuitive approach] or, on the other hand, one
can begin with the maxim of actions [mid-level principles] in conformity with duty
[theory] and seek out the end [intuitive choice] that is also a duty [theory] [top-down or
theory approach]. –The doctrine of right takes the first way [bottom-up]. What
end anyone wants to set for his action is left to his free choice. The maxim of his
action, however, is determined a priori, namely, that the freedom of the agent
could coexist with the freedom of every other in accordance with a universal law.
But ethics takes the opposite way [top-down]. … Hence in ethics the concept
of duty [theory] will lead to ends [intuitive choices] and will have to establish maxims
[mid-level-principles] with respect to ends we ought to set ourselves [theory],
grounding them in accordance with moral principles. … Only an end that is also a
duty can be called a duty of virtue.…
What essentially distinguishes a duty of virtue from a duty of right is that
external constraint to the latter kind of duty is morally possible, whereas the former is
based only on free self-constraint. (3)
The mid-level principles from the doctrine of right are those rights and liberties that
are necessary for the making of social decisions. In a pluralistic environment, e.g., when
making social decisions, with a group that may hold to many different theories and/or
intuitions, it is common, for example, in the United States, to appeal to the Constitution
which can be thought of as mid-level principles. The Constitution thus consists of basic
rights and liberties that most "participants" find either derivable from,
compatible with, or at least not in conflict with their theories and/or intuitions as it
relates to the freedom of all citizens.
A law that is so holy (inviolable) that it is already a crime even to call it in
doubt in a practical way, and so to suspend its effect for a moment, is thought as
if it must have arisen not from human beings but from some highest, flawless lawgiver; and
that is what the saying "All authority is from God" means. This saying is not an
assertion about the historical basis of the civil constitution; it instead sets
forth an idea as a practical principle of reason: the principle that the presently
existing legislative authority ought to be obeyed, whatever its origin. (4)
The mid-level principles from the doctrine of virtue are those ends that are also
duties. ‘They are one’s own perfection and the happiness of others.
Only the concept of an end that is also a duty, a concept that belongs
exclusively to ethics, establishes a law for maxims of actions by subordinating the
subjective end (that everyone has) to the objective end (that everyone ought to make his
end). The imperative "You out to make this or that (e.g., the happiness of others)
your end" has to do with the matter of choice (an object). Now no free action is
possible unless the agent also intends an end (which is the matter of choice). Hence, if
there is an end that is also a duty, the only condition that maxims of actions, as means
to ends, must contain is that of qualifying for a possible giving of universal law. (5)
These mid-level principles are mutually constraining in that each principle limits the
exercise of the other principles through the process of weighing and balancing, and
specification.
When persons do find themselves having to act from a motive of duty, it still may be
the case that they will not have to appeal to their theory or first principle. During the
whole past duration of the human species mankind has already determined many positive
beliefs as to what are moral actions and have developed these mid-level principles by
which actions can be determined.
People talk as if … at the moment when some man feels tempted to meddle
with the property or life of another, he had to begin considering for the first time
whether murder and theft are injurious to human happiness. … [M]ankind must by this
time have acquired positive beliefs, [i.e., mid-level principles] … .
To consider the rules of morality as improvable is one thing; to pass over the
intermediate generalization entirely and endeavor to test each individual action directly
by the first principle [theory] is another. It is a strange notion that the acknowledgment
of a first principle [theory] is inconsistent with the admission of secondary ones
[mid-level principles].
There exists no moral system under which there do not arise unequivocal cases of
conflicting obligation, [mid-level principles]. These are the real difficulties, the
knotty points both in the theory of ethics and in the conscientious guidance of personal
conduct. [When there are] moral laws, [mid-level principles], all claiming independent
authority, there is no common umpire entitled to interfere between them; their claims to
precedence one over another rest on little better than sophistry, and, unless determined,
… [they] afford a free scope for the action of personal desires and partialities. We
must remember that only in these cases of conflict between secondary principles [mid-level
principles] is it requisite that first principles, [Theory], should be appealed to. There
is no case of moral obligation in which some secondary principle [mid-level principle] is
not involved. (6)
III. Weighing And Balancing
Theories, mid-level principles, and intuitions are often times composed of many prima
facie "rights and liberties" that have to be weighed and balanced. This
weighing and balancing process is an attempt to maximize all competing rights and
liberties. All rights and liberties exist in a reciprocal relationship that is mutually
constraining resulting in the necessity to balance. For example, no one could rationally
hold to the view that freedom of speech is an absolute right in the sense that all persons
have the liberty to yell fire in a crowded theater if they so desired. In other words, the
right of freedom of speech needs to be weighed and balanced with the right of safe
assembly. (7) No rights and/or liberties are absolute,
rather they must be specified and balanced with all other competing rights and/or
liberties.
There exists no moral system under which there do not arise unequivocal cases of
conflicting obligation. … They are overcome practically, with greater or with less
success, according to the intellect and virtue of the individual. (8)
Under the section above on the Development Of Mid-Level Principles we saw how Mill
emphasized this point stating
that only in these cases of conflict between secondary principles [mid-level
principles] is it requisite that first principles, [Theory], should be appealed to. There
is no case of moral obligation in which some secondary principle [mid-level principle] is
not involved. (9)
Kant argues that sometimes the certain use of freedom, (like freedom of speech), can
actually become a hindrance to other freedoms in accordance with universal law, (like
freedom of safe assembly). Coercion against those who try to exercise the hindering
freedoms is therefore authorized.
… Now whatever is wrong is a hindrance to freedom in accordance with
universal laws. But coercion is a hindrance or resistance to freedom. Therefore, if a
certain use of freedom is itself a hindrance to freedom in accordance with universal laws
(i.e., wrong), coercion that is opposed to this (as a hindering of a hindrance to
freedom is consistent with freedom in accordance with universal laws , that is, it is
right. Hence there is connected with right by the principle of contradiction an
authorization to coerce someone who infringes upon it.
… [For example], coercion which constrains everyone to pay his debts can
coexist with the freedom of everyone, including that of debtors, in accordance with a
universal external law. Right and authorization to use coercion therefore mean one and the
same thing. (10)
The question now can be raised as to whether this idea of mid-level principles as not
being absolute is contrary to Kant’s moral conception of absolutes. After all Kant
did argue that there could never be any conflict of obligations, whereas Mill argues that
conflict of obligations will arise under any moral system. In regards to conflicting
duties Kant said:
A conflict of duties would be a relation between them in which one of
them would cancel the other (wholly or in part). —But since duty and obligation are
concepts that express the objective practical necessity of certain actions and two
rules opposed to each other cannot be necessary at the same time, if its is a duty to act
in accordance with one rule, to act in accordance with the opposite rule is not a duty but
even contrary to duty; so a collision of duties and obligations is inconceivable.
However, a subject may have, in a rule he prescribes to himself, two grounds of
obligation one or the other of which is not sufficient to put him under obligation, so
that one of them is not a duty. —When two such grounds conflict with each other,
practical philosophy says, not that the stronger obligation takes precedence, but that the
stronger ground of obligation prevails. (11)
It should be noticed that what Kant is talking about here and what is being expressed
with the concept of mid-level principles is totally compatible. The mid-level principles
do not conflict in the sense that one principle says that persons have freedom of speech
and another principle says that persons do not have freedom of speech. Rather, the
weighing and balancing has to do with, for example, freedom of speech in combination with
freedom of safe assembly. Therefore, ethical duties are wide obligations in which various
duties mutually constrain each other, e.g., love of one’s neighbor in general by love
of one’s parents.
… if the law can prescribe only the maxim of actions, not actions
themselves, this is a sign that it leaves a playroom for free choice in following
(complying with) the law, that is, that the law cannot specify precisely in what way one
is to act and how much one is to do by the action for an end that is also a duty. –
But a wide duty is not to be taken as permission to make exceptions to the maxim of
actions but only as permission to limit one maxim of duty by another (e.g., love of
one’s neighbor in general by love of one’s parents), by which in fact the field
for the practice of virtue is widened. – The wider the duty, therefore, the more
imperfect is a man’s obligation to action. (12)
IV. Specification
Specification is the process in which theories and mid-level principles are developed
conceptually and shaped normatively, so that they can be applied to particular
circumstances. Each new decision, within new circumstances, generally requires that our
abstract theories and/or mid-level principles be interpreted in terms of how they can
and/or should be applied to practical life. As Kant said:
The doctrine of right has to do only with narrow duties, whereas ethics has to
do with wide duties. Hence the doctrine of right, which by its nature must determine
duties strictly (precisely), has no more need of general directions (a method) as to how
to proceed in judging than does pure mathematics; instead, it certifies its method by what
it does.–But ethics, because of the latitude it allows in its imperfect duties,
unavoidably leads to questions that call upon judgment to decide how a maxim is to be
applied in particular cases, and indeed in such a way that judgment provides another
(subordinate) maxim (and one can always ask for yet another principle for applying this
maxim to cases that may arise). So ethics falls into a casuistry, which has no place in
the doctrine of right. (13)
The doctrine of right wants to be sure that what belongs to each has been
determined (with mathematical exactitude). Such exactitude cannot be expected in the
doctrine of virtue, [ethics], which cannot refuse some room for exceptions. (14)
Mill also said:
It is not the fault of any creed, but of the complicated nature of human
affairs, that rules of conduct cannot be so framed as to require no exceptions, and that
hardly any kind of action can safely be laid down as either always obligatory or always
condemnable. There is no ethical creed which does not temper the rigidity of its laws by
giving a certain latitude, under the moral responsibility of the agent, for accommodation
to peculiarities of circumstances. (15)
As reasonable as this may sound, Mill has been criticized for presenting a flippant
philosophy in which there are not absolutes and as a result most any action could be
justified as long as it resulted in the greatest amount of happiness, i.e., they argue
that Mill’s moral approach would allow the performing of "immoral" or
"unjust" actions as long as they resulted in the greatest amount of happiness.
The following is an example of how Mill addressed such criticisms.
Again, utility is often summarily stigmatized as an immoral doctrine by giving
it the name of "expediency." … But the expedient, in the sense in which it
is opposed to the right, generally means that which is expedient for the particular
interest of the agent himself. … When it means anything better than this, it means
that which is expedient for some immediate object, some temporary purpose, but which
violates a rule whose observance is expedient in a much higher degree. The expedient, in
this sense, instead of being the same thing with the useful, is a branch of the hurtful.
Thus it would often be expedient, for the purpose of getting over some momentary
embarrassment, or attaining some object immediately useful to ourselves or others, to tell
a lie. But inasmuch as the cultivation in ourselves of a sensitive feeling on the subject
of veracity is one of the most useful, and the enfeeblement of that feeling one of the
most hurtful, things to which our conduct can be instrumental; and inasmuch as any, even
unintentional, deviation from truth does that much toward weakening the trustworthiness of
human assertion, which is not only the principal support of all present social well-being,
but the insufficiency of which does more than any one thing that can be named to keep back
civilization, virtue, everything on which human happiness on the largest scale
depends—we feel that the violation, for a present advantage, of a rule of such
transcendent expediency is not expedient, and that he who for the sake of convenience to
himself or to some other individual, does what depends on him to deprive mankind of the
good, and inflict upon them the evil, involved in the greater or less reliance which they
can place in each other’s words, acts the part of one of their worst enemies. (16)
Later on Mill argues that: "Justice implies something which is not only right to
do, and wrong not to do, but which some individual person can claim from us as his moral
right." (17) "To have a right, then, is, I
conceive, to have something which society ought to defend men in the possession of." (18)
Mill presents five universal principles of justice and injustice that he believed
were as close to being absolute as is possible. They were the following: 1. "unjust
to deprive anyone of his personal liberty, his property, or any other thing which belongs
to him by law." … 2. "legal rights of which he is deprived may be rights
which ought not to have belonged to him." … 3. "considered just that
each person should obtain that (whether good or evil) which he deserves, and unjust
that he should obtain a good or be made to undergo an evil which he does not
deserve." … 4. "unjust to break faith with anyone: to violate an
engagement, ether express or implied, or disappoint expectations raised by or own
conduct." … 5. "inconsistent with justice to be partial—to show
favor or preference to one person over another in matter in which favor and preference do
not properly apply." (19)
Justice is a name for certain classes of moral rules which concern the essentials
of human well-being more nearly, and are therefore of more absolute obligation, than any
other rules for the guidance of life; and the notion which we have found to be of the
essence of the idea of justice—that of a right residing in an individual—implies
and testifies to this more binding obligation. (20)
This is in total accord with what Kant had to say about conflicting obligations when he
said:
When two such grounds conflict with each other, practical philosophy says, not
that the stronger obligation takes precedence, but that the stronger ground of
obligation prevails. …
A principle that makes certain actions duties is a practical law. A rule that
the agent himself makes his principle on subjective grounds is called his maxim;
hence, different agents can have very different maxims with regard to the same law. (21)
The categorical imperative, which as such only affirms what obligation is, is:
act upon a maxim that can also hold as a universal law.
One of the most important concepts in the understanding of Kant’s philosophy of
ethical duties is that the moral law can only prescribe maxims not actions. In fact in his
book, The Metaphysics of Morals The Doctrine of Virtue, he as an entire section
entitled, "Ethics Does Not Give Laws for Action (Right Does That), but Only
for Maxims of Actions" devoting sections VI-IX to this subject. The following
quotes should take away any doubts whether Kant’s philosophy is in accord with
mid-level principles.
… if the law can prescribe only the maxim of actions, not actions
themselves, this is a sign that it leaves a playroom for free choice in following
(complying with) the law, that is, that the law cannot specify precisely in what way one
is to act and how much one is to do by the action for an end that is also a duty. –
But a wide duty is not to be taken as permission to make exceptions to the maxim of
actions but only as permission to limit one maxim of duty by another (e.g., love of
one’s neighbor in general by love of one’s parents), by which in fact the field
for the practice of virtue is widened. – The wider the duty, therefore, the more
imperfect is a man’s obligation to action; as he, nevertheless, brings closer to narrow
duty (duties of right) the maxim of complying with wide duty (in his disposition), so
much the more perfect is his virtuous action. (22)
Kant talks directly about the concept of specification at the end of discussion of the
elements of ethics when he says:
These (duties of virtue) do not really call for a special chapter in the system
of pure ethics. … They are only rules modified in accordance with differences of the subjects
to whom the principle of virtue (in terms of what is formal) is applied in cases
that come up in experience (the material). Hence, like anything divided on an empirical
basis, they do not admit of a classification that could be guaranteed to be complete.
… How should one behave, for example, toward human beings who are in a state of moral
purity or depravity? Toward the cultivated or the crude? Toward the learned or the
unschooled, and toward the learned in so far as they use their science as members of
polite society or outside society, as specialists in their field (scholars)? Toward those
whose learning is pragmatic or those in whom it proceeds more from spirit and taste? How
should people be treated in accordance with their differences in rank, age, sex, health,
prosperity or poverty, and so forth? These questions do not yield so many different kinds
of ethical obligation (for there is only one, that of virtue as such), but
only so many different ways of applying it (corollaries). Hence they cannot be
presented as sections of ethics and members of the division of a system (which must
proceed a priori from a rational concept), but can only be appended to the system. (23)
As can be seen from the above quotes both Mill and Kant would agree and approve of the
concept of mid-level principles and how they are principles that need to be weighed and
balanced, and specified for particular actions.
Conclusion
The synergistic-reflective-equilibrium model not only gives us a clearer philosophical
understanding of how moral decisions are in fact made, but, more importantly, it helps in
the understanding of how moral agents ought to make moral decisions both individually and
as members of a pluralistic society.
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